



THE TRUE STORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
AND THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

**S.Fedyukin *The Socialist
Revolution in Russia
and the Intelligentsia***



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Randall J. Faccott 81
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СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ В РОССИИ
И ИНТЕЛЛИГЕНЦИЯ

На английском языке

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INTRODUCTION

...Some fifteen or twenty years ago one could meet on the streets of Stepnyak, a small town in Northern Kazakhstan, a white-haired man of about ninety, to whom the townsfolk used to bow reverently. This man's name was Vasily Dmitriyevich Selim-Girei, a Soviet engineer and honoured citizen of the town. He was the last offspring of a noble family and a descendant of the Crimean khans, and before the revolution he was a colonel in the tsarist army.

The former prince was not exiled here, to this distant Kazakh town because of his origins. His life, the life of a true patriot, for whom serving the people was the noblest goal, led him to Kazakhstan and made him a well-respected man. He worked his entire life, prospecting in the Urals and on the Kola Peninsula, building the Kashira Power Station, laying the Moskva-Volga Canal, and directing the construction of the Khimki River Terminal in Moscow. During the Great Patriotic War¹ he was evacuated to

¹ The war of liberation of the Soviet people against the aggression of nazi Germany and its allies (1941-1945).

Stepnyak, where he spent the last years of his life.

And in France, at about the same time, there died one of Vasily Selim-Girei's many acquaintances, even a friend from old St. Petersburg high society, and also a prince—Felix Yusupov. He had lived a long life as well. But how diametrically opposed were their fates, the very meaning of their existence. Whereas the Soviet engineer Selim-Girei, who had done many fine things throughout his life, built a school on his own savings in his old age, the Russian émigré Yusupov, who had forgotten his own people and who had himself been forgotten by the people, tried to make some extra money by contracting with American movie and television companies to make a film on the murder of the corrupt tsarist favourite Grigory Rasputin in which he had taken part.

The fates of these two people reflect in miniature, but nonetheless with great historical veracity, the development of the Russian intelligentsia, for whom the October Socialist Revolution was a profound moral watershed. One part of it elected to fight against its people and afterwards to wander in foreign lands. These people, like the French Royalists of the late 18th century, could never forgive the revolutionary people for the loss of their privileges, capital, ranks and orders. But the other part eventually managed to elevate itself above the prejudices of bourgeois and aristocratic morals and become a useful and full-fledged participant in the life of the new, socialist society.

What forces were in operation here? How did the Communists and workers win over people like Selim-Girei, a prominent engineer like

P. P. Pototsky, who was no less than a titled prince, A. A. Brusilov, a well-known general, A. N. Tolstoy, a prominent writer, A. A. Blok, the great Russian poet, K. S. Stanislavsky and V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, important figures in the realm of the theatre, world-famous scientist I. P. Pavlov and many, many others who comprised the upper crust of educated society in pre-revolutionary Russia? Perhaps they were compelled to serve Soviet power by threats and force, by the "Cheka revolvers"¹, or, perhaps, they were bought with almighty gold? This is how some Western historians explain the turnabout in the destiny of the Russian intelligentsia.

No, neither the threat of repression (not a single social system has ever won faithful supporters in this fashion) nor gold (such people cannot be bought or sold) drew the finest representatives of the Russian intelligentsia into the camp of the revolution. There were other, more serious reasons and motives, which prompted them to join the people in implementing common ideals. This pamphlet deals with the process by which the old intelligentsia embraced socialism and with the Soviet intelligentsia today.

1. THE REVOLUTION AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Shortly before the working class of Russia seized power one bourgeois newspaper wrote:

¹ Cheka—the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage.

"Let us assume for a minute that the Bolsheviks win. Who will rule us then? Perhaps cooks, these specialists on hamburgers and steaks? Or firemen, stablemen, stokers? Or maybe babysitters will run to sessions of the State Council between diaper washings? Who are they? Who are these state figures? Perhaps fitters will be taking care of theatres, plumbers—diplomacy and carpenters—the post office and telegraph? ... Is this possible? In such a situation history itself will answer this absurd question for the Bolsheviks.¹

This question posited by the newspaper is not at all idle and rhetorical, despite the fact that it was full of scorn for the working people, who had set out to take power. With whose help did the working class and the Bolsheviks actually intend to administer the state, run the economy, ensure national defence and develop science and culture? Needed for this were numerous cadres of specialists, experienced and knowledgeable people, that is, the intelligentsia. At that time the Bolsheviks' opponents claimed that it was impossible to proceed to seize power through the working class without a rather cultured mass of the population supporting the vanguard of the revolution, without an intelligentsia. Even today there are Marxist "theoreticians" who contend that a socialist revolution cannot be successful in a country where there is not a certain minimum of intellectual forces permeated with socialist ideology.

The historical experience of the revolution in Russia completely refuted these claims. The

¹ *Novoye vremya*, Oktober 24, 1917.

working class of Soviet Russia found the only correct solution to the problem: without waiting for a socialist intelligentsia to be formed, it took power into its own hands and thus created the requisite preconditions for the development and spread of culture throughout the country. Also tackled within the framework of this general problem was, perhaps, the most complex task—the task of creating a new, people's intelligentsia. It was implemented both as a means of training specialists from among the workers and peasants, and as a way of winning over the old, bourgeois, intelligentsia to the side of Soviet power and then re-educating it in the socialist vein.

The training of a new intelligentsia is a rather complicated process requiring many years of hard work, huge expenditure and a large number of educational establishments. The young Soviet state did not have all of this at its disposal during the initial period of its existence. There was a tremendous need for specialists in science, technology and culture. In order to create a state apparatus and a standing army, rebuild the economy following several years of war and develop it, and raise the cultural level of the popular masses, numerous specialists in all fields of the economy, science and technology, culture, and national defence were a must. For this reason getting the old intelligentsia to collaborate with Soviet power became a task of paramount importance. "We are building our state...", emphasised Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the leader of the socialist revolution, "we cannot build it if we do not utilise such a heritage of capitalist culture

as the intellectuals."¹

The intelligentsia in Russia was a comparatively small social segment. At the time of the October Revolution it numbered not more than a million people, or less than 1 per cent of the population. It comprised 280,000 teachers, 60,000 engineers and technicians, 12,000 professors, instructors at institutions of higher learning and researchers, 75,000 medics, 240,000 officers and generals, etc. However, despite its insignificant proportion to the overall population, the intelligentsia played an extremely important role in the country's economic, social and cultural life. It possessed a rich spiritual potential and was instrumental in developing the culture of the Russian people and the other nationalities which made up the empire.

The majority of intellectuals acclaimed the overthrow of the monarchy in February 1917 and the establishment of the bourgeois republic, since the bourgeois democratic revolution accorded with the interests of those groups of the intelligentsia which were involved in capitalist production or the state apparatus. The bourgeois intelligentsia was loyal to the Provisional Government and extended aid to it in the war and other anti-popular actions. There was a segment of the intelligentsia, the democratically-minded one, which was skeptical towards the platforms of the bourgeois parties and which called for radical social change.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Moscow Party Workers' Meeting", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 215.

Then came the October Revolution. As is known, it was carried out by the broad popular masses—workers, peasants, soldiers. Was the intelligentsia with the people or against it? There is no simple answer to this question. Western historians and commentators affirm that the entire Russian intelligentsia rejected the October Revolution and turned against Soviet power and the working class. History, that impartial and objective judge, attests that this is not so.

In the first place, it would be wrong to assume that by the time it seized power the working class did not have its own intelligentsia. It is true that the Russian proletariat did not have any working intellectuals, but it had an intelligentsia as represented by professional revolutionaries. Among them were such talented specialists as the engineers L. B. Krasin and G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, the doctors N. A. Semashko, M. F. Vladimirsky and Z. P. Solovyov, the pedagogue N. K. Krupskaya, the physicist and astronomer P. K. Sternberg and others. But the Bolshevik Party did not have the possibility of finding these people practical work in their immediate field of expertise because they were major Party workers and were primarily needed as political organisers of the masses.

The revolutionary intellectuals were part of the guiding core of the Bolshevik Party. They formed the advanced segment of the intelligentsia, selflessly giving their strength, knowledge and life to liberating the people. Over the decades the Communist intellectuals, under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, prepared the working class to overthrow the rule of the landowners

and bourgeoisie. After October 1917 they had to shoulder the gigantic task of defending the revolution and organising socialist construction. These highly educated, talented organisers drew on the people's creative strength in conducting affairs of state. The American journalist Albert Rhys Williams, who was in Russia at the time, characterised this very well: "The new cabinet of ministers consisted of a group of outstanding people, which transformed it into the most educated and cultivated cabinet which ever ran a state. But I think that the main characteristic of the Bolshevik intelligentsia is its unflagging faith in the people..."

The intellectuals, who had been educated by Lenin's revolutionary party, served as an example for the remaining mass of intellectuals and quite influenced their stand and political conduct during the socialist revolution and Civil War.

The intellectuals favouring democratic principles advanced hand in hand with the Bolsheviks. They considered a revolution effected by the working class to be the only way of solving the difficult social problems facing the country. "To accept or not to accept? Such a question did not exist for me. It was my revolution!"¹ declared the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky. The great Russian poet Alexander Blok appealed to the intelligentsia: "With all your body, with all your heart, with all your consciousness—listen to the revolution."² History shows that many

¹ Vladimir Mayakovsky, *Collected Works* in thirteen volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1955, p. 25 (in Russian).

² Alexander Blok, *Collected Works* in twelve volumes, Vol. 8, Leningrad, 1936, p. 55 (in Russian).

important scientists, engineers, writers, artists, doctors of the time realised that the new social order was bringing wholesome changes to their land and devoted their knowledge and experience to the service of the socialist revolution and the workers' and peasants' power.

The fine Russian scientist K. A. Timiryazev was one of the first to take the side of the revolution and ardently support it. In spite of his ill health and advanced age, he dedicated himself to building the new social order. The workers of Moscow elected him a deputy to the Moscow Soviet. Deeply moved by the proletariat's trust, the scientist addressed a letter to the Soviet, passionately appealing to the intelligentsia and all honest people in the country to support Soviet power. Timiryazev's articles and letters addressed to the intelligentsia played an important role in drawing figures in the arts, sciences and culture to the side of the revolutionary people.

The outstanding Russian scientists I. P. Pavlov, N. Y. Zhukovsky, K. E. Tsiolkovsky, D. N. Pryanishnikov, V. M. Bekhterev, S. P. Fyodorov, N. F. Gamaleya, V. L. Komarov and many others did not interrupt their scientific work. As soon as Soviet power was established in his home town, the famous selectionist I. V. Michurin presented himself before the district land committee and announced his desire to work for the revolution. "I greeted the October Revolution as something fitting and historically necessary in its justice and inevitability..."¹

¹ I. V. Michurin, *Collected Works*, in four volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1948, p. 609 (in Russian).

R. E. Klasson contributed all his knowledge and experience to the cause of the revolution. At the time of the October Revolution he was the director of a joint-stock society which owned all the Moscow electric power stations, and was recognised as a specialist on energy in engineering circles. Klasson paid no heed to the counter-revolutionaries' insinuations that the Bolsheviks only knew how to destroy and that it was criminal to work with them. He preferred the hungry, cold Moscow of 1918 to a director's chair in any foreign country (and such offers were made to him). He did many useful things for the young Soviet Republic, and the Bolsheviks highly valued his work.

We have cited only a few outstanding cultural figures. But along with them thousands of "rank-and-file" intellectuals—doctors, teachers, agronomists, engineers, etc.—unconditionally accepted the new power. Many democratic intellectuals not only welcomed the coming of the revolution, but also "made" it together with the workers, peasants and soldiers, taking the most active part in establishing Soviet power and defending the revolution on the battlefields of the Civil War.

The fact that part of the intelligentsia went over to the side of the revolutionary people was not a chance phenomenon. The social ideals which the working class had propounded and was fighting for under the Communists' guidance found a lively response and support not only in the proletarian and peasant masses. The progressively thinking democratic intellectuals and even a few bourgeois and noblemen recognised the rightness and historical justice of these

ideals and sympathised with them. In spite of belonging or being close to the ruling classes of Russia, they saw the suffering and hardships of the working people and clearly understood that decisive action was needed to lead it out onto the wide road of economic and cultural progress. This is why the October Revolution was perceived by the democratic intelligentsia as a great storm clearing the way for the rebirth of Russia. Many true democrats also realised that it was precisely the Communists who genuinely expressed and defended the working people. Thus in early 1918 the above-mentioned K. A. Timiryazev came to the conclusion that "throughout the thousand-year history of Russia there has never been so much honesty, intellect, knowledge, talent and dedication to the people among the ruling circles as in the ranks of the Bolsheviks".¹

In this way, during the period of sharp class confrontations part of the Russian intelligentsia was able to rise above the ideals and world view of the old society, to understand the regularity and historical necessity of the socialist revolution and side with the revolutionary proletariat. The decisive factors in this decision were the intelligentsia's keen dissatisfaction with the political system of pre-revolutionary Russia, their critical view of Russian reality and their hopes for radical changes in the order of things in their country, where, according to the poet Alexander Blok, "sleep and gloom ruled in all hearts".

¹ K. A. Timiryazev, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1939, p. 287 (in Russian).

But in all fairness it must be acknowledged that a large portion of the intelligentsia adopted a neutral, temporising position, declaring its non-intervention in "politics" and appealing to the new power "not to encroach on its schemes". These people did not understand the essence of Soviet power and the significance of the revolutionary transformations, which opened up wide perspectives for the flourishing of the people's creative abilities and the development of the country's productive forces. Confused and stunned by the maelstrom of the revolution, unsettled in his usual conceptions of "the forward march of progress", the wavering intellectual preferred to "wait until the storm was over", to submit to the victorious power without in the least accepting it. At the same time, many of these intellectuals recognised that their labour was essential to the people and continued to work at factories and offices.

A considerable segment of the intelligentsia, influenced by class sympathies and antipathies and sometimes unable to make head or tail of the events shaking the country, adopted the stand of actively fighting the people's power. It cannot be said that these intellectuals were reactionaries down to the last man before the October Revolution. No, many of them, like the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs), for example, had boldly fought against autocracy and been subjected to hard labour and exile by the tsars. These people looked forward to a revolution, hastened its coming, but they conceived it in quite different forms, as a different combination of driving forces, and expected different results

of it. The most important thing which propelled them away from the socialist revolution was the coming to power of the working class and not the bourgeoisie, in which that part of the intelligentsia had placed all its hopes. But of course, there were members of the old intelligentsia who were openly reactionary monarchists, who had belonged to the anti-revolutionary Black Hundred¹ groups and were not in the least infected by liberal sentiments. The greater part of them was made up of officers, university professors, lawyers, important officials, etc., but there were also writers who were enemies of the revolution: D. Merezhkovsky, Z. Gippius, M. Artsybashev, the philosopher N. Berdyaev, the sociologist P. Sorokin, the socialist B. Savinkov and others.

There is, therefore, no basis for talking of a unified position of the intelligentsia with respect to the socialist revolution. Part of it, the Bolshevik intellectuals and those who sympathised with their social goals, walked at the head of the revolutionary masses or alongside them. Another took the opposite stand and played an active role in the counter-revolutionary camp. Neither the one nor the other comprised the majority of the intelligentsia. The largest number of intellectuals belonged to the third group, which opted for non-interference in politics and unstable, unprincipled, short-lived neutrality. This group was the main object of pressure both on the part of the working class and the Communists, and on the part of the bourgeoisie and its parties.

¹ Armed anti-revolutionary groups in Russia, active in 1905-1907.—*Ed.*

Strictly speaking, the solution to the problem of the intelligentsia as a whole depended upon which political power, the working class or the bourgeoisie, would be able to win over this wavering mass of intellectuals.

2. THE COMMUNISTS FOUGHT FOR THE INTELLIGENTSIA, NOT AGAINST IT

The tasks connected with the further progression of the revolution predetermined the character of the Communist Party's policies with respect to the bourgeois intelligentsia. Experiencing a sharp lack of highly qualified personnel, the Party and the Soviet state decided to put the old intelligentsia at the service of the new social order. To build socialism with the help of the bourgeois intelligentsia—this political paradox was one of the dialectical peculiarities underlying the formation and strengthening of the new society.

The Party's policy of drawing the bourgeois intelligentsia into building socialism and defending the Soviet Republic began on the initiative of Lenin in the very first days of the October Revolution. Soon it was summed up and recorded in the Party programme adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1919. One of its sections read: "...The task of developing the productive forces requires that we make prompt, wide and comprehensive use of the scientists and technologists we have inherited from capital-

ism..."¹ This despite the fact that many intellectuals, as the same document noted, were "saturated with the bourgeois world view". But there was no other way out, no other people.

In this connection the Party programme emphasised two points: on the one hand, not the slightest political concession should be made to the bourgeois intelligentsia and all its counter-revolutionary impulses should be suppressed; on the other, it was essential to mercilessly root out the pseudo-radical, actually ignorant conception that the workers and peasants were in a position to overcome capitalism without learning from bourgeois specialists. Moreover, it was a question not of making temporary and exclusively utilitarian use of the experience and knowledge of the old intelligentsia, but of re-educating this intelligentsia, of transforming it in the final analysis into an ally of the working class in its fight for socialism.

Drawing the main mass of the intelligentsia closer to the working class and into the active struggle to rebuild society along socialist lines was a difficult, complex and contradictory process without precedent in all previous history. The problem of attracting the intelligentsia to achieve victory and strengthen the new social order was faced to its full extent only by the socialist revolution. This spelled the deep-seated, fundamental difference between the socialist revolution and the bourgeois revolution which history did not confront with this problem.

¹ *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings*, Vol. 2, p. 52 (in Russian).

In solving this most difficult task the Soviet state and Communist Party were guided by principles first elaborated by Lenin. In his practical instructions Lenin, the head of the Soviet Government, based himself on the real state of affairs, on the fact that Russia was frightfully poor in cultural forces. But Lenin considered the idea of slowing or deferring for some time the transition to the building of socialism for this reason to be deeply opportunistic. He underlined that the building of socialism had to be begun on the very cultural and economic foundation left by capitalism and with the help of the people who were brought up in the conditions of the old society. "...It is not enough to crush capitalism," Lenin said. "We must take the entire culture that capitalism left behind and build socialism with it. We must take all its science, technology, knowledge and art. Without these we shall be unable to build communist society. But this science, technology and art are in the hands and in the heads of the experts."¹ In the final analysis it was, thus, a question of the Communists' attitude to bourgeois culture.

Lenin believed that it was possible to draw the bourgeois intelligentsia into socialist construction only if certain important principles were observed. One indispensable condition was the establishment of strict control by the working class over the political activities of the intelligentsia. The Communists and the working class summoned the intelligentsia to active

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Achievements and Difficulties", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, 1965, p. 70.

collaboration not for the purpose of sharing power with it. The working class had been prepared for the political leadership of society by all its previous experience in the class struggle and was not about to yield it to anyone. As far as the practical realisation of its dictatorship was concerned, the victorious proletariat had little experience in "management techniques" and in organising the country's economic and cultural life on a scientific basis, and it had to acquire this experience in the course of building the socialist society. This is why Lenin considered it obligatory and not in the least shameful for the workers and peasants to systematically, steadfastly study under the old intelligentsia. He sharply came out against arrogant conceit, against the very idea that it was pointless for the working class to learn from the vanquished bourgeoisie.

A successful solution to the problem of using the knowledge and experience of the bourgeois intelligentsia was possible only if an extensive explanatory campaign was to be undertaken among the working people. The mass of the working people realised that it would be impossible to build the new society without the intelligentsia. They highly valued the work of scientists, doctors, teachers and engineers. But, at the same time, many workers and peasants needed time to overcome their conviction, formed way before the revolution, that any intellectual defended the interests of "the masters". This is why the workers who had brought about the revolution and overthrown the rule of the capitalists were inimically and sometimes even hostilely inclined towards the intelligentsia,

towards, say, an engineer who as recently as yesterday had served the exploiters and represented their interests. It had to be patiently explained to the workers and peasants that capitalism had left them an enormous legacy in the person of the experts and that this legacy had to be used rationally and economically.

The difficulty lay in the fact that it was not only backward, semi-literate workers and illiterate peasants who had to be convinced of the justice of this, but even a few Communists, who rejected using the bourgeois intelligentsia on matters of "principle". The "lefts"—N. Bukharin, N. Osinsky and others—speculating on part of the workers' distrust of the intelligentsia, adamantly opposed the Party's measures to draw experts into organising the economy and building a new culture. G. Zinov'yev and other oppositionists shared their point of view.

Assuming that all the intelligentsia was bourgeois both in its class origin and in its conception of the world and would remain so to the end, some Communists expressed the opinion that the intelligentsia should be excluded from the country's social life. It was precisely not workers, but intellectuals, those who thrust their semi-bourgeois and anti-Marxist views on the workers under the guise of proletarian culture, who were particularly intransigent on this point. The famous director V. E. Meyerhold, for example, who declared that "the sharpest schism was necessary between the intelligentsia and the working class"¹, was one of the defenders of this kind of "class purity" in

¹ *Vestnik rabotnikov iskusstva*, Nos. 4-6, 1922, p. 69.

the new society. Subsequently he radically changed his point of view.

Another extreme was also current, and this was the striving to force all the intelligentsia to act and think along "communist lines". Some Soviet commentators and Party workers thought that if the intelligentsia was living in a country fighting for socialism it should be communist and none other in its way of thinking. They did not admit of the possibility that a significant portion of this layer of society would need a more or less extended period of time to begin to abandon its bourgeois ideological positions without yet maturing to the point of becoming firmly convinced of the principles underlying the socialist world view.

The Communists led by Lenin conducted a stubborn, consistent and principled campaign against these ultra-left views on the position and role of the intelligentsia in the post-revolutionary society. The question of how to deal with distortions of Lenin's policy towards the intelligentsia was discussed at a number of Party congresses and conferences. The need to insistently and consistently oppose the view that the working class could do without the help of the intelligentsia was reflected in the Party programme, as well as in the resolutions of some of the congresses of the Communist Party.

The Communists followed a clear line of strategy with regard to the intelligentsia, based on careful consideration of this social layer's position and behaviour under the conditions of a dictatorship of the proletariat. They never viewed the intelligentsia as a single, faceless mass and took a differentiated approach to its indivi-

dual groupings. Their treatment of the "neutral" intellectuals is convincing proof of this. Lenin pointed out on several occasions that if a certain part of the intelligentsia had begun to waver and turned from hostility to neutrality towards and even collaboration with Soviet power, in this case "our slogan must be one of *agreement*, of establishing good-neighbourly relations"¹. The task was not to make the intellectuals the ideological supporters of those who subscribed to different political convictions "on the second day of the revolution". This was impossible. But it was both possible and necessary to use them to strengthen the new society. The Communists were far from considering the neutrality of many intellectuals to be a sign of counter-revolutionary inclinations. No, they viewed this neutrality to be a necessary step on the way to the intelligentsia's recognising socialist ideas. Lenin defined the scheme for the petty bourgeoisie's transition to the positions of Soviet power as follows: "...From hostility to Bolshevism first to neutrality and then to support of Bolshevism".²

At the time it was preferable for the Soviet state that part of the intelligentsia remain neutral than that it actively fight the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the latter case the enemies of the revolution would have emerged victorious. By neutralising the intelligentsia the Communists were able to win back the bourgeoisie's reserves, facilitate the struggle to

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Moscow Party Workers' Meeting", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, 1965, p. 211.

² V. I. Lenin, "Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 190.

strengthen Soviet power, increase the differentiation of the intelligentsia and consistently turn major layers of intellectually employed workers into its allies. One of Lenin's recommendations to the fraternal Communist parties in the draft of a report on the dictatorship of the proletariat for the 2nd Congress of the Comintern concerned the necessity of neutralising the bourgeois intelligentsia so as not to allow its wavering strata to join the camp of the counter-revolutionaries.¹

While recognising the neutrality of the intelligentsia during the first years of Soviet power to be an objectively useful phenomenon, the Communists nevertheless explained to the intelligentsia that it would have to abandon its position of neutrality in the future, that it was impossible to live in Soviet society and not become imbued by its interests and ideals.

This was the general policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state with respect to the bourgeois intelligentsia. But it is not enough to shape the right policy. It was necessary to elaborate the methods for realising it, to make enormous efforts to actually meet the demands of the Party programme. How could this be accomplished?

For more than fifty years now the legend of the Golgotha of the Russian intelligentsia has been current in Western literature, the legend that the Communists exterminated part of the old intelligentsia, forced part to go into exile and deprived the rest of the right to create. The

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Material for the 2nd Congress of the Comintern", *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, 1969, p. 201.

fact that the part of the intelligentsia which "escaped devastation" went over to the side of Soviet power is usually explained by highly trivial motives: the opportunity to get a bite of bread or fear of the "Bolshevik terror". What was the true historical picture? The fight against counter-revolution from within and without required enormous sacrifices of the workers and peasants. Hundreds of thousands of the best sons of the working people gave their life in the fight for the Soviets. Nevertheless, the new power did not take vengeance upon its enemies simply because they had formerly belonged to the exploiting classes. Nor did it take vengeance on the intelligentsia either because it was closely tied with capitalism or because a large portion of it did not accept the socialist revolution.

In the first months of its existence the Soviet government did not even plan to create extraordinary punitive organs. Military revolutionary committees were active at this time, whose task consisted only of temporarily isolating those elements which might have hindered the firm establishment of the new order. The committees limited themselves to short-term arrests and made wide use of their right to set prisoners free in exchange for their word not to act against the power of the Soviets. Even the bourgeois papers were not closed after the revolution, and terror was out of the question. Not only the ministers of the overthrown Provisional Government, but even general P. N. Krasnov¹, who had fought against the new

¹ General P. N. Krasnov broke his oath not to take up arms against Soviet power, escaped to the south of the country and became one of the organisers of the coun-

power and been defeated by revolutionary troops, were freed after a brief period under arrest.

Or take, for example, a figure like P. Palchinsky. A major engineer, he managed the affairs of the Provisional Government. Shortly before the October Revolution he was appointed commandant of Petrograd and in fact led the defence of the Winter Palace on the day of its historical storming by revolutionary detachments. He was a strong enemy of Soviet power. Nonetheless, not only did Palchinsky remain alive, but the head of the Soviet Government, Lenin, sent a telegram about him to the authorities in Petrograd reading: "...Why has the law on amnesty not been applied to him?

"If he is a scientist, a writer, can't he—in the case of serious evidence against him—be provided particularly privileged conditions (e.g., house arrest, a laboratory, etc.).

"Please answer me *promptly* and in *writing*."¹

Palchinsky was released from arrest and assigned a leading post in the economy.

But whereas in the first months of its existence the Soviet government did without severe repression in dealing with its political opponents, in the future it was forced to conduct a more rigorous punitive policy. The dictatorship of the proletariat responded with a red terror to the white terror of the bourgeoisie, to uprisings and mutinies, to "intellectual" F. Kaplan's shot at Lenin. The invasion of the interventionist ter-revolutionary struggle. Later he actively collaborated with Hitler's troops during the Second World War. At its end he was tried and executed as a war criminal.

¹ *Lenin Miscellany XXI*, p. 235 (in Russian).

troops contributed to an enormous degree to intensifying the class struggle. The notorious R. H. Lockhart, who organised an anti-Soviet plot in the summer of 1918, wrote: "For the intensification of that bloody struggle, Allied intervention with the false hopes it raised, was largely responsible and sent thousands of Russians to their deaths. Indirectly it was responsible for the terror."¹

The Soviet government took severe measures against manifest counter-revolutionaries among the bourgeois intelligentsia, and had full moral and juridical rights to do so. These measures were temporary, and as early as January 1920, when the Civil War was not yet over, a law on the abolition of the death penalty was adopted. But even during the period that the extraordinary law on terror against the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was in effect the Soviet government and its punitive organs had recourse to repression only in those cases where all other measures were exhausted and the enemy still would not lay down arms. As far as the intelligentsia was concerned, extreme caution was exercised in its treatment. Here is what was pronounced on this subject in a December 1919 order of the Presidium of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission: "One must resort to arresting an expert only if it has been established that his work is directed at overthrowing Soviet power. He must not be arrested merely because he is a former nobleman, because he was once an employer and an exploiter, if he meticulously

¹ Quoted from William Irvine, *Live or Die with Russia*, Calgary (Alberta), 1958, p. 29.

does his work."¹

It would be naive to assert that in the process it was possible to entirely avoid mistakes, unnecessary victims, discrepancies between the degree of culpability and the degree of punishment. They all existed. In the heat of the bitter class struggle, because of the unusual intensity of mutual hatred between the revolutionaries and the counter-revolutionaries, mistakes in carrying out repressive measures were inevitable. For various reasons of little import professors I. A. Kablukov, V. I. Vernadsky and Y. V. Gautier, the musician A. B. Goldenveizer, the publisher M. V. Sabashnikov and others were subjected to arrests. Unfounded arrests among the intelligentsia occurred later on as well, particularly during the struggle against sabotage.

However, these facts must not lead one to the conclusion that the organs of Soviet power displayed intentional cruelty, an indiscriminate and wholesale approach. Stringent measures were objectively necessary. The Soviet state and the ruling Party took effective measures to reduce to a minimum or entirely eliminate the mistakes which resulted from the insufficient political maturity of a few people in power.

The use of force could not, of course, ensure the co-operation of the old intelligentsia in socialist construction. The Communists understood this full well. Lenin declared on this subject: "To compel a whole section of the population to work under coercion is impos-

¹ From the History of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission 1917-1927. *Collection of documents*, Moscow, 1958, p. 346 (in Russian).

sible... We can compel them [intellectuals.—*Author*] not to take an active part in counter-revolution, we can intimidate them so as to make them dread to respond to the appeals of the whiteguards... But it is impossible in this way to compel a whole section to work..."¹

While waging a decisive struggle against the counter-revolutionaries, the Soviet government at the same time appealed to the intellectuals to collaborate with it, offered them important posts corresponding to their knowledge and experience, regardless of their political convictions. Even those people, who, stumbling on the slippery path of "unacceptance of the revolution", had ended up in the camp of the whiteguards and interventionists, were drawn into collaboration. The Soviet organs showed tact and understanding towards these intellectuals if they sincerely repented of their errors.

Here, for example, is one of the many episodes showing how the Bolsheviks treated such people. According to the engineer Lev Karpov, a prominent Communist, head of the chemical department of the Supreme Economic Council², "one day a strapping Red Army man in leg wrappings, with a bayonet attached to his rifle and secret instructions under his cuff, appeared on the threshold of his office. He was escorting a long-unshaven man in a rumpled coat. The Red Army man demanded that Karpov show him his papers, then gave him

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Eighth Congress of the RCP (B)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 180.

² An institution running the country's economic activities.

a sealed envelope containing a missive from the Odessa Regional Cheka. The Cheka was 'forwarding' a certain chemist, who, it turned out, had been a member of the counter-revolutionary government in the Ukraine and had been sentenced to be shot, but who was being sent as a prominent specialist to Karpov for him to act 'at his own discretion'.

"What am I, a reformatory or something? " exclaimed Karpov, laughing.

"He, nevertheless, struck up a lively conversation with the 'forwarded' chemist, as a result of which the Red Army man was sent away and the chemist, now without any escort, departed to perform his new duties in the laboratory of the Chemical Department. Thus, did a major scientist, who substantially enriched the chemistry of fossil fuels, return to the path of science."¹

An indiscriminate approach to people and their fates was foreign to Soviet power. If an enemy could be made into an ally or, if the worst came to the worst, a competent helper, the Soviet government was willing to make even hazardous experiments, and, as a rule, was not mistaken in its hopes. But, of course, there was a certain risk present here, and there were some failures as well.

Soviet power welcomed every instance of a bourgeois intellectual turning to collaboration in building the economy and culture. "We value everyone who is willing to work..."² emphasised

¹ O. Pisarzhevsky, *Pages from the Life of a Bolshevik Scientist*, Moscow, 1960, p. 29 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin "Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and

Lenin. Many cases can be cited of the Soviet government drawing intellectuals who had previously fought against the dictatorship of the proletariat into collaboration. Among them were N. N. Kutler, a distinguished Cadet¹ and tsarist minister who after the October Revolution worked for the People's Commissariat of Finance; P. P. Urusov, a former member of the bourgeois Provisional Government, who worked in a special commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council studying the Kursk magnetic anomaly, and others. But, at the same time, the working class severely but justly punished those who tried to fight it arms in hand.

Fully realising that constraint and coercion were not the method to bring the intelligentsia to the side of the revolution, the Communists particularly concentrated on peaceful means of drawing it into socialist construction. One of these was highly paying important specialists and creating somewhat tolerable material circumstances for individual segments of the intelligentsia under the difficult conditions of destruction and famine. The Soviet Government adopted special resolutions to offer assistance in their scientific work to the major scientists I. P. Pavlov, N. Y. Zhukovsky, K. E. Tsiolkovsky and other scientists and artists. Qualified specialists received the highest salaries, five, six and even more times greater than those of the

Delegates from the Fronts, November 4(17), 1917,
Collected Works, Vol. 26, 1964, p. 294.

¹ Cadets—members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which represented the interests of the big bourgeoisie.

people's commissars and the head of the state, Lenin. A special commission was created to improve the living conditions of scientists and men of letters, and the salaries of engineers, teachers, doctors and others were raised. The following document is a curious piece of evidence. In May 1920 the commission resolved to increase the number of food rations for experts in Petrograd to two thousand. The resolution read in part: "To be given out besides food rations: one pair of shoes each, one suit (or material for a suit), three sets of underclothes (or material for underclothes) and six pairs of socks (or stockings) a year. As for warm clothing, it is to be issued to individuals only in relation to their degree of need."¹ How characteristic this document is, reflecting the new power's concern for the scientists and, at the same time, bearing the stamp of those bleak years, when the country was in a very difficult position, the economy was ruined by the world war and the management of the tsar's ministers, and the Soviet government could not provide all the needy with the necessary means of existence. It was a time when even the member of the Soviet government in charge of distributing food products fainted from undernourishment.

This policy of the Soviet government did not always meet with understanding on the part of certain intellectual circles, who saw in it the intention of the new power to "buy" their

¹ *The Organisation of Science in the First Years of Soviet Power (1917-1925). Collection of documents, Leningrad, 1968, p. 341 (in Russian).*

knowledge and experience. In March 1919 Professor M. P. Dukelsky addressed Lenin a letter in which he declared that the Soviet Government was supposedly planning to "bribe" the intelligentsia with the prospect of an "animal prosperity". He added that without inspiration, without inner fire, without a need to create, not a single intellectual would produce anything, however highly his labours were paid.

Professor Dukelsky's prejudices and delusions were not inherent in him alone. In his letter he expressed the thoughts and feelings of many old intellectuals. This is why Lenin considered it necessary to answer his letter in the central newspaper *Pravda*. He explained to the professor, and simultaneously, to broad circles of the intelligentsia that any "bribery" was out of the question. The issue concerned a large mass of people, who had always received the best salaries in the past and who in the Soviet period would retain sufficiently high ones, albeit lower than before. This could not be called bribery. At the same time Lenin explained to the intelligentsia that if it would treat the exhausted soldiers and worn-out workers, embittered by centuries of exploitation, with full understanding, sympathy and a feeling of comradeship, the rapprochement of the working masses and the intelligentsia would proceed at giant strides.¹ This letter of Lenin's played a large part in drawing the still wavering segments of the

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Reply to an Open Letter by a Bourgeois Specialist", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29 pp. 228-31.

bourgeois intelligentsia into co-operation with Soviet power.

Re-educating the intelligentsia along socialist lines, helping it alter its world view and overcome its distrust of socialism became the main and most effective method of acting upon it. The Communists did not at all require the bourgeois intellectuals to immediately renounce their old views or change them forthwith. The Party demanded only one thing of them—that they honestly devote themselves to their work. Participation in the extensive economic and cultural construction programme would gradually lead them to change their outlook, for, as Lenin said, “the engineer’s way to communism is *different* from that of the underground propagandist and the writer; he is guided along *by the evidence of his own science...*”¹.

The essence of Lenin’s strategy with respect to the bourgeois intelligentsia was to create an atmosphere of comradeship, surveillance and organised proletarian influence. He insisted that the Communists “learn modesty and respect for the professional work of the experts in science and technology”, “order less—rather, not order at all”. “Unless,” he noted, “our leading bodies, i. e., the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions, guard as the apple of their eye every specialist who does his work conscientiously and knows and loves it—even though the ideas of communism are totally alien to him—it will be useless to expect any serious progress in socialist con-

¹ V. I. Lenin, “Integrated Economic Plan”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, 1965, p. 144.

struction."¹

The Communists attached great importance in the matter of attracting the intelligentsia to various public organisations, in particular the trade unions. Various congresses, conferences, courses and meetings of intellectuals also helped them to understand the essence and goals of Soviet power. But basically the process of re-educating intellectuals of the old school went on in the work collective, in direct contact with the mass of working people.

The flower of the Communist Party and the Soviet state busied themselves with drawing the intelligentsia into socialist construction and the country's defence. Lenin played an outstanding role in successfully solving this problem. A. V. Lunacharsky, N. K. Krupskaya, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. I. Kalinin, M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuibyshev, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. A. Semashko, M. F. Vladimirska, A. M. Gorky and other prominent Party, state and Soviet cultural figures devoted much effort and energy to working with the intelligentsia. In carrying out Lenin's policies with respect to qualified personnel inherited from the old society they did some outwardly inconspicuous but highly important and necessary work to win over the intelligentsia.

Historical experience has shown that the methods of working with the intellectuals elaborated by the Communist Party, its definition of the course to follow in effecting their

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, 1966, p. 194.

transition to a position of collaboration with Soviet power, were the only right ones. Of course, the victorious working class could have found opportunities to force the intelligentsia to serve it, and, even in those hungry years, could have found the means to buy the experts' knowledge and experience, as the bourgeois states do. But neither course would have offered a cardinal solution of the problem. Only by winning the intelligentsia over morally, introducing it to the ideals of the revolutionary people, developing trust in the experience and competence of the specialists, bringing about close communion between the intelligentsia and the mass of workers and peasants could the Communists be helped in solving a problem of enormous difficulty, that of tearing the intelligentsia away from the bourgeoisie, of re-educating the bourgeois intelligentsia into a socialist intelligentsia. It was a long process. But it was the best way.

3. THE BOURGEOIS INTELLIGENTSIA HELPED THE SOVIETS WIN THE CIVIL WAR

The Civil War prevented the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia from fully tackling the building of the foundations of socialism. The Soviet state had to strain every nerve to beat off its numerous enemies. Naturally, under the conditions of the Civil War and armed intervention it became particularly important to attract experienced personnel from among the bourgeois intelligentsia. Organising the work of industrial enterprises to satisfy the needs of the

front, mobilising the forces of science to defend the country, providing officers for the army—all this required qualified, experienced, able, knowledgeable staff.

The intelligentsia was drawn into collaborating with the Soviet organs in the most varied fields—military, economic and cultural. This was dictated not only by practical considerations, but also by the political situation. It was necessary to actually draw the intelligentsia into the life of the country, direct its attention to practical issues and convince it that Soviet power had set itself the task of preserving Russia's sovereign integrity and rebuilding her economy and culture on a mightier basis. Brainworkers had to be helped to find their place in the country's social and political life.

The task of prime importance in consolidating the new social order was the creation of the Red Army and its provision with commanders. Everyone knows that the first decree of the Soviet Government was the Decree on Peace. The Bolsheviks appealed to all the combatting powers to end the bloody war and conclude a peace without annexations and indemnities. But not only did the imperialist governments not listen to the voice of the Land of Soviets, they embarked on a campaign against it. At the same time, the Civil War unleashed by the resistance of the overthrown bourgeoisie and nobility, who were supported by the international forces of reaction, became increasingly severe.

To defend the young Soviet Republic from internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention it was necessary to create a regular, discip-

lined army of workers and peasants. Experienced officers, well versed in military affairs, were needed for this. But the Soviet state did not have available enough people trained in the art of leading troops. True, part of the officer class had joined the Bolshevik Party even before the revolution, but there were still very few Communist officers and they were, as a rule, junior officers.

What was the way out of this difficult situation? There were several avenues open to the young Soviet state for providing its army with commanding officers. For example, a number of military instructors could be invited from the armies of other countries. David Francis, the United States Ambassador to Russia, offered the Soviet Republic his country's assistance in this matter. He described his motives for this decision in a telegram to Secretary of State Robert Lansing on March 26, 1918: "My (real) and strictly confidential reason is that army so organised [with the aid of allies.—Author] can by proper methods be taken from Bolshevik control and used against Germans, and even its creators..."¹

Of course, the Soviet Government could not pursue this perilous course and decidedly turned down Francis' "Trojan horse". The Soviet Republic began to train the commanders for its army by methods determined by the character of the socialist revolution. In the first place, a large number of commanding officers sprang

¹ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918. Russia*, Vol. 1, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1931, pp. 487-88.

up in the course of the Civil War, which was a good school of warfare. The working people produced such outstanding commanders as M. V. Frunze, V. K. Blyukher, S. M. Budyonny, V. I. Chapayev, I. Y. Dybenko and thousands of other combatting red officers. Furthermore, the republic set up its own academies to train commanding officers. During the Civil War about seventy thousand of them completed military schools and courses. The overwhelming majority of them was comprised of workers and peasants.

But, at the same time, the Soviet state could not renounce providing the workers' and peasants' army with experienced military experts by extensively drawing on military experts from the old army and fleet, although there were a number of serious difficulties in so doing. The famous military man, Lieutenant-General M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, wrote in his memoirs: "How did I, a general of the 'old regime' who had held high posts in the imperial army, find myself a supporter of Lenin, whom I did not understand very well then, even before the October Revolution? ...

"If this sharp and sudden change had occurred only in me, it would not be worth writing about—there are more ways than one that people's character and convictions get shattered. But the point is that I was one of many.

"There is an erroneous conception that the overwhelming majority of former officers fought, arms in hand, against the Soviets. But history shows otherwise."¹ It is worth listening

¹ M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, *All Power to the Soviets. Memoirs*, Moscow, 1958, p. 5 (in Russian).

to the words of a man who came a long and difficult way, from general in the tsarist army to general in the Soviet Army. What, actually, does history show?

The October Revolution split the officers' corps into several groups. One of them, relatively small, immediately joined the workers and peasants. Quite a number of cases are known of officers who had held high military ranks offering their services to the revolutionary people. One of them was the famous military engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Karbyshev, who was subsequently a hero in the Great Patriotic War. A prominent Party worker, M. S. Kedrov, wrote that "when Kerensky was still in power, N. M. Potapov, aide to the Chief of Staff and general-quartermaster, offered, and rendered, his services to the Bolsheviks' military organisation through me. After the October Revolution we appointed Potapov Chief of Staff and office manager of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs".¹

Many of the old army's commanding officers, while not voluntarily entering the service of the new power, nevertheless unconditionally obeyed its orders from the very first days. Lieutenant-General in the Soviet Army A. A. Samoilov wrote: "A few days after November 7 I received instructions from the Soviet Government that had been established by the revolution to leave 10th Army Headquarters and go to Brest as chairman of the military commission for a truce with the Germans... Before receiving this

¹ *From February to October*, Moscow, 1957, p. 174 (in Russian).

order I was a general in the old army, serving in that army, but from that moment I broke my ties with the old army and took up military service for Soviet power.”¹

A considerable number of officers did not recognise Soviet power, but neither did they choose to openly fight it, and took a wait-and-see attitude at first. These officers did not want to fight the people, and so they did not combat against the Bolsheviks, who, although they considered them “usurpers”, had the support of the workers and peasants as they could see. Later on, however, the train of events in the Civil War and intervention forced these officers to side with Soviet power or its opponents.

Finally, an equally numerous group of officers, closely connected with the bourgeoisie and the nobility, openly went over to the counter-revolutionary camp and made up its shock force. Their exclusive education, political views and attachment to certain customary forms and ways of living organically bound this group of officers with the past.

Lenin set the Communists and the Soviet state the bold task, based, however, on concrete analysis of the situation, of drawing the bourgeois military experts into building the Red Army and defending the young Soviet Republic from attack by its numerous enemies. Of course, he knew perfectly well that a considerable segment of the officers and generals in the old army was hostilely inclined towards Soviet power. He also knew that the working masses

¹ A. A. Samoilov, *Two Lives*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 177, 182 (in Russian).

were hostile to the old military specialists, viewing them as the defenders of the exploitative order they had overthrown. But it is a measure of Lenin's greatness that in the very difficult situation forced upon the people by the Civil War he was able to see what was still incomprehensible to the masses at large and for many Party workers as well, that without using the knowledge and experience of the old military experts it would be impossible to build a workers' and peasants' army, and without creating such an army in a very short period it would be impossible to preserve the gains of the revolution.

These officers were drawn into defending the republic from the very first days of the Soviet state's existence. The military experts were already used in repulsing the troops of the counter-revolutionary general Krasnov near Petrograd. Even more of them participated in the battles against the Kaiser's troops, which started an attack on Soviet Russia. The Red Army began to be formed in February 1918, and in the first months of its organisation about eight thousand officers and generals from the old army voluntarily joined it. May 1918 the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets passed a resolution on the obligatory mobilisation into the Red Army of military specialists. Thus, their use for defending the Soviet Republic was given a legislative form.

Most of the old military experts were used for field service in units, formations and also large military headquarters and administrations. It can be said without exaggerating that there was not a single regiment, not a single division, even

among those bearing the proud name of Communist, which did not have former officers and generals in command or staff positions. Throughout nearly the entire Civil War the post of commander-in-chief of the republic's armed forces was held by the former colonels in the old army I. I. Vatsetis and S. S. Kamenev. The proportion of former tsarist officers and generals among the commanders in the Red Army amounted to 76 per cent in 1918, 53 per cent in 1919 and 42 per cent in 1920. It must be noted that the figure decreased not because less military specialists were being called up into the Red Army or because they got discharged, but because the number of commanders from among the workers and peasants trained in academies and maturing into experienced commanders at the front grew. By the end of the Civil War officers and generals of the old army comprised about 35 per cent of the Red Army's commanders, or approximately seventy to seventy five thousand men.

The motives which brought this large number of military intellectuals into the ranks of the Red Army are varied. In the first place, the October Revolution made many officers take a new look at the state of affairs and brought about far-reaching changes in their mentality and perceptions. They realised that the popular masses were right in their struggle and did not want to draw apart from the people. Furthermore, the Civil War and the invasion of foreign troops enormously influenced their political convictions. Every honest man realised that allied with the whiteguard governments, which had sprung up in various regions of the huge

country, the imperialists would suppress the freedom and independence of Russia and it would cease to exist, transformed into a semi-colony of the imperialist powers. Finally, the goals of the revolution and the policies of the Communist Party and Soviet government, aimed at changing Russia from a backward country into a mighty power, were the most convincing arguments for the military experts. Moved by feelings of patriotism, many former generals and officers sided with the revolutionary people.

Quite a few military specialists became heroes of the Civil War. The former general A. D. Stankevich, who was taken prisoner when wounded, indignantly spurned all the whiteguards' promises and was hung. His remains are buried by the Kremlin wall in Moscow. The former Colonel G. K. Petrov was one of the twenty-six Baku commissars¹ who were shot by British interventionists and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Such a remarkable man as A. A. Taube merits a little more detail. Holding the post of Chief of Staff and then Commander of the Omsk military district, Lieutenant-General Baron A. A. Taube supported the Bolsheviks even before the October Revolution. In 1918 he was one of the organisers of the Red Army in Siberia and commanded combat operations. When the fighting here ended in a temporary defeat of the revolutionary troops, Taube was charged with establishing connections with Soviet Russia. With false papers the "Red general" made his

¹ Twenty-six Caucasian revolutionaries who were executed in 1918 by Socialist-Revolutionaries and British interventionists.

way to the west, but was identified and thrown into prison. Y. B. Shumyatsky, one of his fellow-prisoners who happened to be left alive, wrote afterwards: "The thought of escaping and finding himself free in the taiga, among the Siberian partisans, did not leave Taube... The general believed that the revolutionary element in the taiga needed military guidance and that he, as an experienced military man, could be a precious help to the partisans. Taube fundamentally thought out some strategic plans and asked comrades who had connections with the outside world to transmit his directives to the people in the Siberian taiga."¹

A field court martial condemned Taube to death. But before the sentence was carried out one more attempt was made to get the general to "renounce Bolshevism" and go over to the side of the whiteguards. But the prisoner responded to all promises with the words: "My white hairs do not allow me in my declining years to join the camp of the interventionists and enemies of the working people of Russia." The patriot died in jail without staining his honest name by serving the enemies of the working people.

Many similar examples can be cited. The prominent Party and military man S. I. Gusev wrote of the military experts that "many worked indefatigably, underslept and underate, many endured the adversities of combat together with their units, fought heroically and died heroically".²

¹ *Central Siberia*, Novosibirsk, 1927, p. 156 (in Russian).

² S. I. Gusev, *The Civil War and the Red Army*, Moscow, 1958, p. 56 (in Russian).

But this was, of course, not always the case. There were a fair number of military intellectuals who joined the Red Army with a counter-revolutionary aim, who betrayed the Soviet government. There would have been significantly more instances of betrayal had the Party not established surveillance of the activities of the experts by military commissars, of whom there were 5,200 by the end of the Civil War. In this the Communists to a certain extent drew on the experience of the French Revolution in the late 18th century. It would be incorrect to suppose that a commissar's duties consisted in standing beside military specialists, revolver in hand, and forcing them to do what the combat situation required. Such was not, nor could it have been, the approach used, for it would have been impossible to force an experienced combatting officer, if he himself did not wish it, to elaborate successful strategic plans, and give orders for battle under armed threat.

Bringing a former officer to serve Soviet power meant skilfully approaching him, without morbid suspiciousness, and helping him to understand the need the people had of his work, fathom the essence and sense of the events occurring in the country and take the only correct position in the fight against the interventionists and whiteguards. That is exactly how the Bolshevik commissars proceeded. Thanks to their painstaking, daily educational work based on trust and great exactingness, many thousands of former officers took the right path, becoming honest soldiers and giving their experience and knowledge to the cause of the working people.

The Party and Lenin highly valued these officers' command of military operations. Lenin declared that "it was only with their help that the Red Army was able to win the victories it did".¹ The former officers and generals of the old army played an outstanding role in the further formation of the Red Army, and some of them, like B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. I. Yegorov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, L. A. Govorov, A. M. Vasilevsky, F. I. Tolbukhin, I. Kh. Bagramyan and V. D. Sokolovsky, became Marshals of the Soviet Union.

In the process of widely drawing military experts into the formation of the Red Army and the defence of the Soviet Republic much experience was gained which was of great help in organising the extensive use of the intelligentsia at large in various fields of state, economic and cultural construction. Not a single central or local organisation in charge of a segment of the economy of any importance could do without bourgeois specialists.

It was particularly important to ensure the co-operation of the most qualified personnel among the old intelligentsia—scientists, professors and college teachers, major engineers. With this aim the department for drawing the forces of science into the cause of state construction was instituted under the People's Commissariat for Education in January 1918. In the spring of the same year the Academy of Sciences expressed the desire to collaborate with Soviet

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies", *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, 1965, p. 413.

power. The organisation of expeditions to study natural productive forces acquired considerable scope, and it was possible to draw a large group of scientists into working for the country's defence. While filling the orders of the Red Army the scientists solved many complex technological problems connected with supplying the army with ammunition and weapons.

Nor was scientific work interrupted in other most important fields. In June 1920, in Saratov, Professor N. I. Vavilov gave a report of exclusive scientific and practical import expounding new foundations for the variability of organisms. His theory was of great importance for the biological sciences and became a guiding compass in the work of botanists, selectionists and agronomists the world over. A group of young scientists, M. Y. Suslin, P. S. Uryson, P. S. Alexandrov, A. Y. Khinchin, A. N. Kolmogorov and D. Y. Menshov, made important discoveries in mathematics. Important theoretical work was done under the physicist, Academician A. F. Ioffe. The Atomic Commission of the Academy of Sciences, made up of such major scientists as A. N. Krylov, A. F. Ioffe and D. S. Rozhdestvensky, began its work. The remarkable scientist F. A. Tsander came up with a rocket engine which could overcome the force of the earth's gravity.

Drawing up the State Plan for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) was a significant achievement of scientific theory. On Lenin's initiative the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia was created in early 1920. Its members were major scientists and technologists—G. O. Graftio, M. A. Shatelen, A. A. Go-

rev, K. A. Krug, I. G. Alexandrov, B. Y. Vedeneyev and many others. They were not Communists; on the contrary, nearly all of them opposed Soviet power. But from the point of view of science they had to acknowledge that Soviet power opened boundless perspectives for scientific creation and the development of the country's economy. This is why the authors of the electrification plan worked under great tension, full of creative inspiration. In the foreword to the book describing their plan, the specialists wrote: "We were inspired by the ardent desire to respond to the extent we could to the great creation of a new life, of which our country, by the will of fate, was the proclaimer... We are at rest about our future, for it is in the strong hands of the true builders of life..."¹

The fact that under the unbelievably difficult conditions of the blockade, famine, the Civil War and intervention creative thought flourished among scientists and that science became closer to the life of the people, to its needs and requirements, is an outstanding phenomenon in the history of the Russian intelligentsia. Maxim Gorky, who had a close knowledge of the scientific world in those years and himself did much to establish mutual understanding between the scientific intelligentsia and the Soviet government, later wrote to Academician S. F. Oldenburg: "I saw with what enormous heroism, with what stoic courage the creators of Russian science endured agonising hunger and cold, saw how they worked and saw how they

¹ *The Plan for the Electrification of Russia*, Moscow, 1920, p. 5 (in Russian).

died. My impressions during that period evolved into a feeling of deep and respectful rapture in front of you, heroes of free, fearless, investigatory thought. I feel that Russian scientists, their life and work during the years of intervention and blockade have given the world a magnificent lesson in stoicism..."¹

A large number of specialists worked at factories and plants, in industrial management. They also included former proprietors. The progressive workers realised that there was nobody they could learn the art of management from except the bourgeois experts, that only their help could ensure the more or less normal work of enterprises. The workers saw that many specialists were hostile to the new order and deserted their enterprise at the first convenient opportunity, but nevertheless they left such people in leading posts. Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee M. I. Kalinin, himself a former worker, recalled the following episode: "I was working at the AIVAZ Factory and knew the workers' attitude towards engineer Petrov. I knew it very well. Their relations were far from amicable, but when the workers seized power, they made him the factory's director, motivated by the fact that he had been very able at exploiting them under capitalism and would be able to exploit the factory under the new conditions."²

Every honest specialist could not help sympathising with the economic policy of the workers'

¹ *Pravda*, September 4, 1925.

² *Verbatim Report of the Work of the 1st All-Russia Congress of Engineers Belonging to Trade Unions, Moscow, 1923*, p. 28 (in Russian).

and peasants' state. His feelings as a builder and creator were inflamed by a government which, in the midst of destruction, before fully repulsing its enemies, had set about restoring and rebuilding the backward economy it had inherited from capitalism. Thanks to the concrete work the Soviet government drew them into, a great many specialists were torn away from the part of the intelligentsia opposed to the revolution. Hundreds of knowledgeable engineers came to the enterprises in a highly sceptical frame of mind, the idea of building socialism being deeply alien to them. But with the passage of time they became good managers of production and active implementers of the Bolshevik ideas concerning the country's economic rebirth.

Many hundreds and thousands of experts did not conceal that they did not believe in the Bolshevik plans for socially transforming society, but they wanted to work for Soviet power honestly and devotedly, true to their calling to always create and not destroy. In a few more years these people would not only come to believe in socialism, but make every effort, contribute all their knowledge and experience to hasten the building of socialism.

The prominent metallurgist I. P. Bardin splendidly conveyed the mood of this segment of the intelligentsia when he wrote: "We engineers were famished for interesting work, we were exhausted by the stagnant monotony of technological thought and we got down to construction with great ardour, putting our heart into this fine cause."¹

¹ I. P. Bardin, *An Engineer's Life*, Novosibirsk, 1939, p. 102 (in Russian).

It was very important for the young Soviet state to ensure the co-operation of such wide segments of the intelligentsia as teachers and medical personnel. It was incredibly hard to work in the schools surrounded by war and destruction. The buildings became unsuitable and there were not enough textbooks, school equipment and writing materials. Nonetheless, the main body of teachers honestly fulfilled its duty to the people, teaching children to read and write and introducing them to the rudiments of culture. The amount of schools in the country not only did not decrease, but even increased, and the number of children in school grew by almost two million over the pre-revolutionary figure.

The activities of the medical intelligentsia were particularly important under the conditions of the Civil War and intervention. The small group of medical personnel was responsible for returning wounded soldiers to active duty, fighting epidemics and the consequences of famine, providing medical services for the population, carrying out sanitary and preventive measures, and much else.

The doctors' struggle with mass epidemics of typhus, cholera and Spanish flu was a particularly brilliant page in the history of Soviet medicine. Medical personnel worked fifteen to sixteen hours a day without sufficient medicine, bandages and equipment. A catastrophe was nevertheless averted. "Without the slightest exaggeration," testified one of the organisers of medical services, the Communist physician Z. P. Solovyov, "it can be said that the anti-epidemic struggle during the Civil War was an

assault the military physician approached consciously, remembering his medical and revolutionary duties."¹ In this "assault" the doctors suffered great losses. The death-rate among medical personnel in the east of the country, for example, reached 80 per cent, thus surpassing the number of soldiers killed in the most bloody encounters. Red Cross, rural and urban hospital staff worked no less selflessly.

The revolutionary people highly valued the noble work and self-sacrifice of the medical and sanitary personnel. Central and local organs of the press and Red Army newspapers of the time published many letters and notices from country and city dwellers, wounded or sick Red Army soldiers expressing their gratitude to members of the medical profession. They were given orders, diplomas of honour and valuable presents.

The Communists made energetic efforts to try to attract the artistic intelligentsia to their side. The Party appointed a man of truly encyclopedic knowledge, A. V. Lunacharsky, People's Commissar for Education, to work with writers, painters and artistes of all kinds. The actor L. I. Prozorovsky recalled Lunacharsky's first meeting with the cream of the Moscow intelligentsia. "And then 'the workers' commissar', 'a certain Lunacharsky', began to speak... It grew quieter and quieter in the room. Those present forgot about the cold... The 'people's commissar' for workers and peasants continued to speak. Many actors who had lived all their

¹ Z. P. Solovyov, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1956, p. 421 (in Russian).

life in Moscow and Petersburg and knew the most prominent Russian theatre and art critics assured me after this meeting that they had not yet had occasion to meet a man who had such an all-round knowledge of the art and literature of all peoples as this people's commissar."¹

Maxim Gorky played an invaluable role in drawing the old intelligentsia to the side of revolutionary Russia. At the height of the Civil War he published an "Appeal to the People and the Working Intelligentsia" in which he proclaimed: "...People in the intellectual professions must decide who is closer to them—the defender of the old order, the representative of the obsolete, no longer possible, power of the minority over the majority, so fatal to our culture, or the stimulator of new social ideas and emotions, who brings to life the beautiful dream of all working people, a dream of the happiness of free labour and the brotherhood of nations."²

Gorky's voice was heard the world over and had enormous repercussions on all layers of Russian society. It had a sobering effect both on the confused intellectuals and on those who had still not given up their hopes of restoring the old ways.

Gorky did much work under unbelievably difficult circumstances in Petrograd to win the intelligentsia over to the side of Soviet power, helping writers, scientists, artists and actors. He organised an unofficial committee to help the intelligentsia, made efforts on their behalf to

¹ L. I. Prozorovsky, *In Years Past*, Moscow, 1958, p. 126 (in Russian).

² Maxim Gorky, *Collected Works* in thirty volumes, Vol. 24, Moscow, 1953, p. 189 (in Russian).

have canteens set up and food rations distributed, took charge of the publication of their works, interceded for people who had been arrested, etc. In a word, as Alexander Blok expressed it, fate made Gorky "the intermediary between the people and the intelligentsia".¹

But, of course, the activities of even such outstanding individuals as A. V. Lunacharsky and M. Gorky would not have had perceptible results had they not been firmly supported by the Communists and by state policy with regard to cultural construction and the cultural heritage of the past.

It is a fact that many intellectuals, allowing themselves to be convinced by the counter-revolutionaries' lies about the ruin of civilisation allegedly brought about by the Bolsheviks and seeing nothing but the destruction of the old order, openly declared that they would not work with Soviet power. What was the actual state of affairs in the sphere of culture?

It is hard to cite a problem the Communists devoted as much attention to as that of cultural heritage. They declared that it was precisely the working people who were the rightful heirs to the mass of knowledge mankind had accumulated and that without coming into this inheritance, without mastering all the achievements of world culture, the workers and peasants would be unable to set about building the culture of their future world, and hence, would be unable to build socialism as well.

At the same time, the Communists pointed out that inheriting the culture of the past and

¹ *Iskusstvo*, April 1, 1918.

coming into possession of its riches did not mean being omnivorous and indiscriminate. They persistently opposed a simplified, unselective approach to the cultural heritage, attempts to assert that it was possible to unquestioningly, uncritically use all elements of the old culture. Inheriting the culture of the preceding society meant using all its valuable, healthy democratic elements in building the new society and rejecting all that was stagnant, reactionary and anti-popular in it.

The proletarian cultural revolution defends, protects, preserves and develops the culture it has inherited from past generations. But, of course, human beings, the carriers and creators of the people's cultural, material and spiritual values, are what is most precious. Although not all cultural figures were with the people that had effected the great revolution, although the Communists' ideas were foreign to many of them, the working class and its Party devoted close attention to winning them to the side of Soviet power.

A militant caste of chosen "priests" of the bourgeois intelligentsia accused the Soviet government of not caring for the intelligentsia. But this is what Professor A. Yashchenko, who could hardly be suspected of Bolshevik sympathies, wrote in the Berlin émigré journal *Russkaya kniga*: "It would be unjust to accuse the Bolsheviks of personal persecution or even contempt of Russian men of letters or scientists. On the contrary, impartiality, which, unfortunately, is not often encountered in our day, forces one to admit that the lives that have been in the least danger during this time have been those of

the writers and scientists."¹

The restructuring of the philosophy, consciousness and creative activity of all honest artistes and contributors to culture proceeded under the influence of the realities of the revolution and the cultural policies of the Soviet state and brought them closer to the interests of the working masses. Within a few months after the October Revolution those who were not blinded by hatred for Soviet power and had retained their ability to sensibly appraise what was going on could already see that the Soviet state's measures in the realm of literature and the arts bore witness to its desire to organically connect the building of a new culture on a mass basis with the best progressive traditions of the old culture, that the revolution was not only not about to destroy the best ideals of the national culture but was actually taking them under its protection, calling for them to be spread among the popular masses.

The Communists' work with the artistic intelligentsia bore fruit. Its best representatives, regardless of how the advocates of the bourgeoisie threatened them with socialism, began to aid the Soviet government in the field of cultural construction. The healthiest, most democratic segments of the artistic intelligentsia, while not accepting or understanding everything in the first years of the revolution, nevertheless gradually, though not without mistakes and vacillations, made their final choice. Not all of them could, like Vladimir Mayakovsky, say "My revolution!", but they did not leave their people in the difficult years. They remained in

¹ *Russkaya kniga*, No. 1, Berlin, 1921, p. 3.

Russia not as a result of "revolutionary feeling", but of national, patriotic feelings, of love for their native art. The well-known Russian poetess Anna Akhmatova put this very well:

I heard a voice. It promised solace.
"Come here," it seemed to softly call.
"Leave Russia, sinning, lost and graceless,
Leave your land, pray, for good and all.
I'll cleanse your hands of blood that stains
you,
And from your heart draw out black shame,
The hurts of failure, wrongs that pain you
I'll veil with yet another name."
With even calm deliberation
I raised my hands to stop my ears,
Lest that ignoble invitation
Defile a spirit lost in tears.¹*

Once, after reciting this poem, Alexander Blok told his audience: "Akhmatova is right. It is unbecoming talk. It is a disgrace to run away from the Russian revolution."² Much remained incomprehensible to the poetess, unresolved, but she unconditionally stuck to her conviction:

*I am not with those who left their land
To be torn to bits by enemies.
I hear not their flattery uncouth,
My songs I will not give to them.³*

* Translated by Gladys Evans.— Ed.

¹ Anna Akhmatova, *The Flight of Time*, Moscow, 1965, p. 195 (in Russian).

² K. I. Chukovsky, *Contemporaries*, Moscow, 1962, p. 484 (in Russian).

³ Anna Akhmatova, op. cit., p. 201.

This love of Russia was uppermost in many intellectuals. A fellow-artiste of the famous Russian opera singer L. V. Slobinov attests: "He taught us both professional discipline and love for our Motherland: almost nobody in our group of soloists subsequently emigrated, although many, including me, were made offers to trade the 'hard Russian reality' for a comfortable existence in a capitalist country. During the Civil War L. V. Slobinov found himself in territory occupied by the whites. They offered a special steamship to take him to the West. In this connection he told his secretary Y. Yevstafyeva: 'Be what may and how it may, I will not leave Russia for anywhere.'"¹ Slobinov was hardly an exception. The millionaire A. A. Bakhrushin, who founded a theatre museum, could have emigrated without particular difficulty. But his love for his homeland and its culture kept him in his cold and famished country. He donated his museum to the city of Moscow and himself actively collaborated with Soviet power.

Thus, one can cite, among the factors influencing the position of a considerable portion of the artistic intelligentsia, the Soviet state's attitude towards the cultural heritage of the past, love for their country, love for their work. This is why, like Akhmatova, the literati A. A. Blok, V. Y. Bryusov, V. V. Veresayev, V. A. Shishkov, S. A. Esenin and A. S. Grin, the actors K. S. Stanislavsky, M. N. Yermolova, A. I. Yuzhin, V. I. Kachalov and A. V. Nezhadnova, the composers N. Y. Myaskovsky,

¹ S. Migai, "Concerts for the People", *Sovetskaya muzyka* (Soviet Music), No. 11, 1957, p. 29.

B. V. Asafyev, R. M. Glière and M. M. Ippolitov-Ivanov, the painters and sculptors S. T. Konenkov, A. Y. Arkhipov, K. F. Yuon, V. Y. Makovsky, V. M. Vasnetsov, P. P. Konchalovsky and A. S. Golubkina and many other intellectuals in the field of culture did not let others have their "songs" and worked to the extent that they could.

At the same time the fires of the Civil War were tempering young artistes who were soon to help build a new, Soviet, culture. Literature was enriched by K. Fedin, I. Babel, E. Bagritsky, B. Pasternak, N. Tikhonov, M. Sholokhov, D. Furmanov, A. Fadeyev and M. Bulgakov, while such talented young performers as V. Barsova, M. Maksakova, M. Reizen, I. Kozlovsky, B. Shchukin, A. Tarasova, N. Khmelyov, I. Ilyinsky and others appeared on the stage in the first decade following the revolution.

The stratification of the old intelligentsia, the appearance of significant groups in it loyal to Soviet power, increased every year. But elements that were clearly counter-revolutionary and fought uncompromisingly against the power of the workers and peasants also made their appearance. The participation of bourgeois intellectuals in conspiracies and uprisings was very widespread. Thus, in the summer of 1919 Soviet punitive organs exposed a large counter-revolutionary organisation called the National Centre, whose members included quite a few professors, engineers, lawyers and teachers. In 1921 the well-known poet N. Gumilyov was found to be one of the active members of an anti-Soviet plot. In the case of obvious counter-revolutionaries Soviet organs, naturally, acted in accordance

with the stern laws protecting the proletarian state. But with regard to the intellectuals who were not guilty of grave anti-Soviet actions although they remained potential enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a policy was pursued of overcoming their resistance, keeping watch on their activities and explaining to them the goals and policies of Soviet power.

This was how matters stood with the intellectuals on the territory of the Soviet Republic, mainly in the centre of the country. But in the course of the Civil War a significant portion of the intelligentsia found itself on territory under the control of counter-revolutionary governments and interventionists. Many intellectuals did not support the political slogans of the white governments and even actively opposed them in the underground, others did not directly participate in political events or, like the writer V. G. Korolenko in Poltava, which had been seized by Ukrainian nationalistic troops, protested against atrocities and acts of violence and interceded for those unjustly sentenced. But many intellectuals went over to serve the white generals and interventionists.

During and after the Civil War part of the counter-revolutionary forces emigrated. The white emigration is an unprecedented phenomenon in world history. Never before in any country did two million people find themselves without status, the political enemies of the power which had established itself in their native land. Among the émigrés were bankrupt politicians, landowners and capitalists, merchants and officials of various ranks, generals, officers and soldiers from the routed white



Gleb Maximilianovich Krzhizhanovsky (1872-1959)—Russian revolutionary, Soviet governmental and Party figure, electrical engineer, scientist, academician



Alexandra Mikhalovna Kollontai (1872-1952)—prominent in international and Russian revolutionary movement, Soviet diplomat




Georgi Vasilyevich Chicherin (1872-1936)—revolutionary, Soviet statesman and diplomat. The author of a number of works on the history of the revolutionary movement, international relations and culture




Alexei Maximovich Gorky (1868-1936)—writer, the father of Soviet literature. His literary and social work was instrumental in the creation of socialist society and Soviet culture



Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849-1936)—eminent physiologist, the founder of materialist teaching on higher nervous activity. His portrait by artist Mikhail Vasilyevich Nesterov




Ivan Vladimirovich Michurin (1855-1935)—biologist, founder of the scientific selection of fruit and other crops in the USSR, honorary member of the USSR Academy of Sciences



Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky (1847-1921)—the founder of Soviet hydroaerodynamics. In 1920 Lenin initiated a decree of the Council of People's Commissars instituting the Zhukovsky Prize for the best works on mathematics and mechanics



**Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935)—scientist and
inventor, the father of modern rocketry**



Alexei Nikolayevich Krylov (1863-1945)—Soviet shipbuilder,
mathematician, academician



Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev (1888-1972)—prominent Soviet aircraft designer, academician



Alexander Ivanovich Kuprin (1870-1938)—Russian writer. In 1919 he emigrated; however, realising he had made a mistake, he returned in 1937



Alexei Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1882-1945)—Soviet writer, public figure, academician



Maria Nikolayevna Yermolova (1853-1928)—Russian actress,
People's Artist of the Republic (1920), Hero of Labour (1924)



Sergei Sergeyevich Prokofiev (1891-1953)—composer, pianist, conductor, People's Artist of the Russian Federation



Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein (1898-1948)—Soviet film director, art theoretician, instructor, Merited Art Worker of the Russian Federation



Left to right: composer Dmitry Shostakovich (seated at the piano), poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, theatre director Vsevolod Meyerhold (1929)



Vera Ignatyevna Mukhina (1889-1953)—Soviet sculptor, People's Artist of the USSR. The author of the 24-metre *Worker and Collective Farmer*, which crowned the Soviet pavilion at the 1937 Paris World Fair (today the sculpture stands at the north entrance of the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievement in Moscow)

armies, part of the bourgeois intelligentsia, simply frightened philistines.

Emigration not only divided "society", it often even split up families. S. F. Oldenburg, for instance, served the Soviet Republic long and usefully as the permanent Scientific Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, while his son was a prominent figure in the white emigration. The brother of A. Latsis, one of the heads of the Cheka, was an active member of an émigré terrorist organisation. Many other such examples could be cited.

A few outstanding Russian cultural figures also lived abroad—the writers A. Kuprin, A. Tolstoy, I. Bunin, A. Remizov and L. Andreyev, the composers A. Rachmaninoff, N. Metner and A. Grechaninov, as well as scientists, actors and artists. Most of the émigrés left during the Civil War, but emigration abroad continued during the twenties, though in lesser numbers, of course. It is then that the great opera singer F. Chaliapine, the chess player A. Alekhine, the chemist V. Ipatyev, the important engineer A. Chichibabin, the actor M. Chekhov, the poetess M. Tsvetayeva and others left the country.

The motives that impelled these people to go abroad were most varied. Some of them fled Soviet Russia because of "ideological differences" with the workers' and peasants' power. Others were frightened by the difficulty of living in the ruined and impoverished country. Still others thought that Russia had perished, and with her Russian culture. There were those who hoped to wait until the bad times were over in Western Europe or China. Finally, part of the bourgeois intelligentsia was exiled abroad by

organs of Soviet power, in the autumn of 1922. for instance.

It would be wrong to suppose that the loss of part of the intellectuals in the Civil War or their flight abroad did no injury to the development of culture in the country. The loss of a considerable number of outstanding scientists, technologists, literati, artistes and educators noticeably drained the country's already none too numerous cultural resources and had a negative effect on several important spheres of life. But the young socialist republic found the strength and opportunity in a comparatively short period to recoup the losses suffered by the intelligentsia and educate numerous young people to help build Soviet culture. Besides, one must not forget that many intellectuals abroad were connected primarily with Russia and the culture of her peoples through their roots, fate and creative work. The culture of the Russian emigration in its best, most progressive manifestations is part of the culture of our people.

The fate of the intellectuals who left the country was varied. Some of them, like the literati A. Tolstoy, A. Kuprin and M. Tsvetayeva, the general A. Ignatyev, the artist I. Bilibin, sooner or later realised the profound erroneousness of their decision and returned to their homeland. Between 1921 and 1931 over 180,000 émigrés returned to Soviet Russia. Others, like D. Merezhkovsky and Z. Gippius, remained inveterate foes of their homeland to the end. The split within the white émigrés grew even greater during the Second World War. A large part of them joined the fight against the nazis and actively participated in the Resistance

Movement. France, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Italy are justly proud of the exploits of B. Vilde, A. Levitsky, I. Troyan, Y. Kuzmina-Karavayeva, M. Shafrova-Marutayeva, V. Obolenskaya, A. Fleisher, F. Makhin, V. Smirnov and many others. The Soviet people is proud of them, too, as witness the bestowal of orders of the USSR on heroes of the Resistance. Other émigrés came back to their homeland in the rear of Hitler's troops to establish a "new order" there.

The first years after the revolution were thus a period of "great value reassessment" for the Russian intelligentsia. For many intellectuals they were the beginning of a path which subsequently led them to a conscious acceptance of the ideas of socialism and active participation in socialist construction. For others they marked their further rift with the people, their final passage to the camp of its enemies, to the camp of white émigrés.

4. THE OLD INTELLIGENTSIA FULLY EMBRACES SOCIALIST POSITIONS

The successful conclusion of the Civil War and the country's first steps towards restoring the economy opened up wide opportunities for the intelligentsia to grow even closer to Soviet power. Giving the lie to numerous predictions, the Bolsheviks not only withstood the onslaught of the forces of world reaction, but even during the war set about ending the economic dislocation. The proposal of the plan, grandiose for those days, for electrifying Russia, the start-

ing-up of major plants and factories which had remained idle during the war, the labour enthusiasm of the working class all showed the old intelligentsia that the Bolsheviks had set a firm course for the quickest possible economic and cultural renewal of the country.

The intelligentsia's sphere of activity increased. Tasks of such huge importance as getting industrial production smoothly running, restoring the forces of production in agriculture and setting cultural construction in motion could not be coped with successfully without comprehensive application of scientific and technical achievements and extensive use of the knowledge and experience of the intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia realised that a new time had come, an era of true, creative life to which abstract planning was essentially alien, and that the socialist state gave men of science, technology and culture vast scope for actually applying all their knowledge and talent to creative work. The number of specialists sincerely helping the workers and peasants to overcome the enormous difficulties in getting the dislocated economy going again and developing culture grew each year. They worked honestly and conscientiously at industrial enterprises, scientific institutions, schools and hospitals, for state organs.

By the mid-twenties the professional co-operation of the intelligentsia with the working class and peasantry under the peaceful conditions of building a new life had been ensured. It was almost entirely involved in the country's economic and cultural life, doing fruitful work for the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But for all this the problem of the intelli-

gentsia was far from solved. It was not enough to involve an intellectual in a concrete job, to get an active worker out of him. It was necessary to transform him psychologically, to change his world outlook, to re-educate him in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This was a much more difficult and complex task than ensuring the intelligentsia's professional collaboration.

The intelligentsia's assimilation of the new ideology was a complex, relatively slow and contradictory process. It could not have been otherwise, for the past weighed too heavily on the intelligentsia for it to be able to quickly rid itself of it. A considerable part of the intelligentsia, particularly of the higher echelon, was still strongly bound to the past by its views, habits and traditions. The difficulties of daily life caused tiredness, irritation and distrust of the new power. The remnants of the defeated anti-Soviet parties were active among the intelligentsia, maintaining its political instability. Although part of the country's economic and cultural life, many intellectuals remained "internal émigrés" who did not abandon the thought of restoring capitalism.

Lenin thought it a mistake to fear a certain reactionary mood, inevitable in the first period of the socialist revolution, among various elements, for it was impossible to expect and demand that all the classes and strata of society adopt the socialist view of the world soon after the proletariat seized power. He taught that such people should not be brushed aside but, on the contrary, re-educated in the socialist spirit if possible.

The restructuring of the intelligentsia's psychology was a far from smooth and peaceful process. Its directions, turns and deviations were influenced in the final analysis, by the internal and international status of the Soviet Republic, the policy of the working class and its Party towards the intelligentsia and the successes of socialist construction.

For a significant segment of the intelligentsia the recognition that the activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government were aimed at the good of the people was its first step towards conscious participation in building the new life. When the great senior artist of the Maly Theatre A. I. Yuzhin, a man of moderate convictions, told the Bolsheviks: "I know that you are in the midst of a difficult struggle which at times drives you to exhaustion, but I believe that you want a great good, I believe that you have great strength, that you are faced with great opportunities"¹ his declaration (and there were many like-minded people) was proof of the correctness and success of the Communists' work with the intelligentsia. For the time being more could not be expected of them.

They passed through doubts and hesitation to an understanding of the essence of popular power. The Party and state did not need careerists, hypocrites, ideological chameleons. The latter were not only social ballast, but a particularly harmful element as well because of their demoralising influence on the masses. Soviet power preferred dealing with an intellectual who did not hide his disagreements with it but

¹ Central State Archive of Literature and Art.

honestly and sincerely tried to understand it. A. V. Lunacharsky described one of them, the theatre critic A. R. Kugel: "Many things aroused the greatest doubts in him, and the keen individualist alive in him could never perish until his physical death. But he very much wanted to work at building the new society. He honestly regarded himself entirely capable of this."¹ This was the path naturally followed by many intellectuals on their way to understanding their place in the new society.

The profoundly patriotic activities of the Communist Party and Soviet state were an important factor helping the intelligentsia better to understand the new social order and draw closer to it. Their home and foreign policies were aimed at preserving and consolidating the unity of the peoples making up the USSR, strengthening the country's defensive might and independence, increasing the international prestige of the Soviet Union. This could not but impress a certain part of the intelligentsia. Of course, they understood patriotism in their own, old, way. Foremost for them was "great Russia", while for the communists it was "the great Soviet Union". But if the Communists were with and for their country, the intellectuals were willing to co-operate with them, for their homeland's historic fate was henceforth indissolubly linked with the Communist Party.

The position of the intelligentsia during the period of aggravated relations between the Soviet Union and England in 1923 is character-

¹ A. V. Lunacharsky, *Reminiscences and Impressions*, Moscow, 1968, p. 313 (in Russian).

istic in this sense. A. V. Lunacharsky testified that "when Lord Curzon threw down a dangerous challenge for us, you know how Russia responded. Huge, unheard-of demonstrations were held in Moscow with the active participation of students, schoolchildren, doctors and even, strange as it may seem, priests, who declared that if it came to war they would give their blessing to Soviet Russia".¹ It would have been unreasonable to disregard these patriotic feelings of the intelligentsia; they needed to be turned to use by the Soviet state.

Many concrete facts proved to the intelligentsia that the Communists, unlike the tsar's clique, would not sell out Russia's interests and tolerate other states' interfering in her internal affairs. The defence of the interests of the state and the people by the Communists and Soviet government gave the intelligentsia an opportunity better to see the essence of socialism as an order under which Russia would be a great and integral country. This fresh understanding contributed to drawing the intelligentsia closer to the new ideology, which assumed an indissoluble unity between the principles of patriotism and of internationalism.

Objective scientific data, which left no room for idealism and mysticism, were an important factor which further impelled the intelligentsia, particularly the scientists, to reconsider their view of the world. These people spontaneously evolved a materialistic understanding of the laws of nature and social development, for they

¹ *Sibirsky pedagogichesky jurnal* (Siberian Pedagogical Journal), No. 2, 1923, p. 14.

wanted to be honest researchers and come to honest conclusions. At the same time, they needed help to become truly consistent materialists of the Marxist type.

This is why the Communists and the ideological institutions of the Party and Soviet community needed to work comprehensively, purposefully and insistently to further detach the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie and its ideology, and bring the spirit of Marxism, the ideals and principles of socialist philosophy, into the environment, life and work of the intelligentsia. This was one of the most important directions of the Party and state's ideological activities. They were guided in their work by their recognition of the intelligentsia's heterogeneity and consequently the variety of paths its individual segments would follow on the way to socialism, on condition that they received the utmost support, of course. In August 1922 the 12th Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) resolved that "systematic support and practical co-operation is necessary with respect to the truly non-affiliated technologists, scientists, teachers, writers, poets, etc., who at least in its main lines, have understood the true meaning of the great revolution that has occurred".¹

Attaching exclusive importance to the role of the intelligentsia in building the new society, the Communists tried to increase the influence of Marxist ideology on it. Varied methods and channels of ideological pressure were used with

¹ *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions...*, Vol. 2, p. 394.

this aim. The Soviet press was a great help to the Communist Party in the matter. The views of bourgeois ideologists on the intelligentsia as a neutral force keeping aloof from the people's fight for a better future were decisively rebuffed in the articles of Party commentators. On the contrary, the latter held, the intelligentsia should take a most active, energetic part in building the new Russia. Only by following this course, by fully merging with the working people, could it expect spiritual rebirth. That part of the intelligentsia which was still vacillating and hesitating had to firmly and clearly determine its ideological position, renounce all anarchistic and individualistic views, and reject the conception of the intelligentsia as the "salt of the earth", called upon to lead society.

The Soviet press simultaneously sharply criticised leftist, nihilistic views of the intelligentsia as an unnecessary and even harmful force and underlined its great value in building a life on new foundations. "We need it," wrote A. V. Lunacharsky, "we need it in the field of technology, of agriculture, in the field of education, we need it, and very much so, in the field of art..." And the most highly qualified intellectuals were so essential to the Soviet state "that neither our stocks of gold nor any other state property is comparable in value to them"¹.

The Socialist Academy, the Institute of Red Professors, the House of the Press, the House of Scientists, the House of Teachers, scientific and technical clubs and so on played a significant

¹ *Rabotnik prosveshcheniya* (The Worker in Education), No. 7, 1921, p. 10.

role in work with the intelligentsia. They carried out extensive cultural and educational work as well as active ideological measures among the intelligentsia.

Lectures, debates and discussions on topical subjects were an interesting form of work with the intelligentsia. Particularly pointed ideological questions were raised during debates on the public position and role of the intelligentsia under the new historical conditions. Political science study groups and courses set up by Party organisations were a very fruitful way of politically educating the intelligentsia, especially its lower echelons. These activities helped their members to understand the essence of the new social order and pressing political problems and master the rudiments of revolutionary theory.

Courses to retrain teachers, doctors and other specialists were a mass method of politically educating the intelligentsia. They were a great help in expanding their members' political horizons. "The courses gave us a mighty impulse in evolving a Marxist line, got us interested in social and political problems and made us view many things with a different eye," testified a participant in a teachers' retraining course in Pskov. Such courses engulfed a great number of experts. About one hundred thousand teachers alone took them between 1922 and 1928.

The trade unions, particularly those of the non-production type which included brainworkers—unions of educators, medical personnel, artists, engineers, technologists and scientific personnel—were a great school for socially educating the intelligentsia. By 1924 over 90 per

cent of the intellectuals belonged to trade unions. The latter worked hard to educate them and increase their participation in socialist construction.

Much attention was devoted to establishing comradely relations between technologists and workers right at industrial enterprises. The point was to restructure the psychology of both the workers and the intellectuals, two social groups which had previously been separated. This was impossible to achieve by purely administrative measures. A comprehensive programme of political and educational work had to be carried out both among the workers and the experts.

Carrying out the instructions of the highest Party organs, communist cells, trade union and various Soviet organisations conducted extensive explanatory work among the workers. Reports were read at general meetings of production groups about the role of engineers and technicians in socialist construction, friendship meetings between specialists and workers, joint clubs and other measures were organised, etc. In 1925 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) enacted a decree "On the Work of Specialists", in which it recognised that it was necessary to improve the living conditions of engineers and technicians and strengthen their authority. The Central Committee particularly emphasised that in evaluating the prospective usefulness of experts it was necessary to take into account their work experience and services in their particular field of specialisation. The Communist Party enjoined that in no case an alienated, hostile attitude

towards specialists should be permitted on the basis of their class origin. Local Party and trade union organisations passed similar resolutions.

Restructuring their world outlook was especially difficult for the artistic intelligentsia. The main problem was for writers, actors, artists, etc., to change the subject matter and ideological aim of their work, and this, of course, required changing their whole philosophy. Such transformations are not easy and painless. In addition, of no small importance in this respect were the artist's already formed creative devices, the depictive means he had elaborated, his style. It often happened that the artistic means with which an artist had depicted pre-revolutionary *realia* were entirely unfit to portray the revolution and its people in a truthful manner and on a high artistic level. Not only the goals and tasks of literature and art in the new society, but also the means of expression the artist had to use became the object of debate. Thus, confrontations in the social, political and philosophical fields mingled with differences in the realm of aesthetics.

A certain amount of time and of comprehensive ideological pressure were thus required for the restructuring of the artist's outlook in both the intellectual and theoretical, and the emotional spheres. This is why creative individuals could not be expected and required to immediately go over to the revolutionary camp. The mere fact of not hiding their political views or playing the chameleon, but openly and honestly declaring their political and aesthetic beliefs, was enough to give these artistes the possibility of reacting with greater understanding and sensitiv-

vity to all the good things that in their opinion the government, still alien to them, was doing for the people.

The main goal of the Communist Party in the realm of literature and art consisted in supporting the growth of socialist culture, on the one hand and, on the other, helping the artistic intelligentsia, to varying degrees close to the new order, to overcome the influence of bourgeois ideology and actively participate in the construction of socialism.

What were the most preferable ways of influencing the creative intelligentsia? They were varied, but the main principle guiding the Communists in their attitude towards artists of different but not hostile views was the use of ideological conviction, education, the observance of democratic norms and, finally, the intellectual and tactful proof of the superiority of socialist over bourgeois ideology. The Communist Party had acquired much experience in struggling with the bourgeoisie in the sphere of politics. But a mechanical transfer of this experience to the realm of literature and art could not have positive results, for the class struggle is expressed in more complex and mediate forms in art, not so openly and directly as in politics. The problem cannot be solved by the methods used in political, military or economic conflicts. The Communists, both then and now, considered attempts to create a new culture and art through "Red Guard attack" methods, decrees from above, speculation and voluntarism to be profoundly erroneous and capable of greatly harming the cultural and artistic development of the popular masses.

This is why ideological conviction and re-education were the main methods used by the Communist Party and the Soviet state in working with the creative intelligentsia. There was no other way of freeing the artist from the weight of the old ideology and inspiring him to create the ideological and aesthetic values needed by the people. "It is a matter of course," wrote the People's Commissar for Education A. V. Lunacharsky, "that the state has no intention of forcefully imposing revolutionary ideas and tastes on artists. Only a falsification of revolutionary art can arise from such a use of force, for the prime quality of true art is the artist's sincerity. There are other methods beside force: convincing, encouraging, properly educating the new artists."¹ All these measures were used with enormous success in the Communists' comprehensive work to ideologically re-educate the creative intelligentsia.

Artists followed different paths towards the progressive philosophy of the time. There were intentional attempts to oppose Marxism-Leninism with hostile aesthetic ideas and theories, and mistakes by honest people trying to comprehend the principles of this world outlook that was new to them. But however hard some resisted the ideas of Marxism-Leninism at a certain stage, however much others hesitated and erred, these ideas engulfed their consciousness and invaded the process of artistic creation, for they were backed by the truth of the times, the truth of genuine art. Every artiste "mastered"

¹ A. V. Lunacharsky, *Art and Revolution*, Moscow, 1924, p. 33 (in Russian).

Marxism-Leninism not because "it was so ordained", but because he discovered the strength and beneficence of this teaching, guided by his inner spiritual need and his life and artistic experience.

The freedom of artistic creation was a difficult issue in the social life of those years. To what degree could the state control the activities and ideological positions of an artist? What could and should be the mutual relations between artist and state, ruling class, society? These problems were equally important for the artistic intelligentsia and the working class and its Party.

In those years the ideas of the German Social-Democratic theoretician Karl Kautsky on the non-intervention of the proletariat in the realm of art were quite widely popular. In his book *The Day After the Revolution* he wrote that after the proletariat seized power supreme order would appear in production and total anarchy in intellectual life and art. The groundlessness of this assertion is obvious. Artistic creation in a class society is always and everywhere connected with politics. The only question is with what politics and what class. Anarchy in art is also the expression of a certain policy, certainly not serving the working class.

In their ideological work in the realm of literature and art the Communists were guided by Lenin's tenet as to the need for purposeful influence of the artist's work and the Party's right to guide the country's artistic life. The revolution offered the artist full freedom of creativity. But the Communists could not stand by and allow artistic creation to develop chao-

tically. They had to guide the process and shape its results so that literature and art ideologically serve the tens of millions of working people and be directed at them.

The aim of Party guidance of literature and art was to stimulate the positive development of artistic creation in the interests of the popular masses, on the one hand and, on the other, to combat bourgeois influences in literature and art and attempts by the bourgeoisie to use them in the struggle for power.

Overcoming the apolitical attitude of the intelligentsia, particularly the artistic intelligentsia, was one of the main aspects of the Party's ideological work. In those years the intelligentsia's apolitical stand did not have a unified political character. People often stuck to apolitical and non-affiliated slogans not because of their anti-Soviet views but because of their disenchantment with the old bourgeois illusions and ideals. They had rejected the old ideas but had not yet understood and assimilated the new and beneficial elements ushered in by the socialist revolution. Their apolitical stand was a peculiar transitional stage on the way to a new understanding of the world.

This was the case, for instance, of the literary group The Serapion Brotherhood, which justified apolitical attitudes and spoke of its revulsion for bourgeois ideals. The declarations of its members, and even more so their work, testified that they had already begun to overcome bourgeois conceptions but were still far from a new world outlook. But a transitional process was underway. "A few of us," recalled the writer Konstantin Fedin, "quite soon and

sharply set ourselves literary tasks as social ones."¹ The same can be said of other literary groups.

But there was also a quite different kind of apolitical mentality, embodied in demands to free literature and art from communist influence. The vacuum thus created would, naturally, have been used to increase the influence of bourgeois ideology. This was an active, aggressive form of apolitical mentality, against which the Communists conducted a principled campaign. A particularly important role here was played by Marxist critics and commentators, who exposed the true goals of the militant apolitical mentality and pointed out ways of overcoming it. It was necessary to define oneself ideologically—such was the leitmotif of many articles and speeches by Marxist sociologists.

Within none too long a period apolitical mentality in all its manifestations was overcome by the artists. The successful conclusion of the process was a result of the differential approach used by the Communists in their work with the creative intelligentsia, their refusal to use a single measure for all. A flexible and consistent policy with respect to the loyal or simply ideological inert elements and a firm, principled campaign against the ideas of ideological opponents ensured that in the end the apolitical mentality among the artistic intelligentsia was overcome.

The Communists' great difficulty in ideologically winning over the artistic intelligentsia was the result of the various "leftist" modernistic

¹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 10, 1936.

currents present, above all formalism and its numerous modifications—futurism, imagism, suprematism, etc. Proclaiming a total revolution in form, the “lefts” attached no importance to the ideological content of art. In the final analysis the “lefts” formalist trickery merely expressed the bourgeois idea of art for the sake of art, art for the select few.

The above does not, of course, mean that “leftism” in art was necessarily an indication of its adherents’ bourgeois views. There were “lefts” and lefts. Take the case of the famous Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky. He fought for a genuinely communist literature and regarded formalism critically. “Of all leftism,” he said, “we take only that which is revolutionary, which actively helps socialist construction...”¹ There was much that was useful and innovative and that enriched Soviet art in the work of such “lefts” as the prominent director V. E. Meyerhold. It is just that the hypertrophy of “leftism” in art inevitably led to the strengthening of bourgeois aesthetic tendencies, to the activisation of the ideas of bourgeois individualism and anarchism.

The threat of art’s being torn from the people, from realistic foundations, could not fail to alarm the Soviet public. Discussions on “the formal method” held in 1924 were of great importance in exposing the ideological roots of formalism and overcoming its influence. The proponents of formalism failed in trying to prove that the time for realism was past, that the

¹ As quoted in V. Katanyan, *Mayakovsky. A Literary Chronicle*, Moscow, 1961, p. 387 (in Russian).

new reality did not admit of a realistic art.

By the mid-twenties formalism as an aesthetic trend quickly began to grow obsolete. Its most ardent adherents and even guiding lights, who subsequently greatly enriched Soviet culture, gradually dropped it.

This fact once again testifies to the flexibility of the Communists' policy in the field of art and culture. Their purpose was not only to debunk anti-Marxist theories, but also to free those artists who sincerely strove to serve the people and the cause of the revolution from their sway. Making use of positive tendencies in the artists' philosophy and work, endeavouring to confirm and strengthen these tendencies and patiently, tactfully overcoming bourgeois ideas, prejudices and illusions, the Communists gradually won the creative intelligentsia over to socialism.

A stereotyped, administrative, crude approach was inadmissible in this delicate work. In many of its documents the Communist Party noted that a differentiated approach was necessary in working with intellectuals, particularly artists. The Communists' fight for the so-called fellow-travellers is an example of their flexible and at the same time ideologically purposeful policies. The name "fellow-travellers" designated men of letters and artists who had accepted the revolution but did not quite clearly perceive its goals and tasks, and, therefore, wavered ideologically. By defining its attitude towards them the Party hoped that in the course of socialist construction these people would overcome alien ideological influences.

The Party line in literature and art was most fully expressed in the resolution of the Central

Committee of the RCP(B) "On the Party's Policy in the Field of Creative Writing", adopted on June 18, 1925. The Party's Central Committee proclaimed the main task facing literature in this period to be the ideological unification of its main creative forces on the basis of proletarian ideology. It was noted in the resolution that proletarian writers were the buttress of the Party. As for the "fellow-travellers", the Central Committee warned against indiscriminately including them all in the camp of the enemies of the revolution. "The general directive here should be a tactful and cautious treatment of them, i. e., an approach which provides all the conditions for them to embrace communist ideology as soon as possible."¹

The resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) demonstrated that the Party's policy was aimed at creating an atmosphere of creative emulation for all writers recognising Soviet reality. It was extremely important in ideologically unifying Soviet writers, eliminating perversions in the literary movement and determining the character of the literary process, the path writers were to follow regardless of the creative groups they were connected with. This decision of the Party's Central Committee greatly influenced the development of theatre, painting, sculpture and cinematography as well as literature.

The Communists' consistent and principled struggle against bourgeois influences and tendencies and their concern for the development and

¹ *On the Party and Soviet Press*, Moscow, 1954, p. 345 (in Russian).

ideological purity of Soviet culture also predetermined the first major literary achievements. By the mid-twenties Soviet literature had been enriched by important works committed to the goals of the Party and people, portraying the new man and the building of the new world. These were D. Furmanov's *Chapaev*, A. Fadeyev's *The Rout*, A. Serafimovich's *The Iron Flood* and others. This period also saw a rapid increase in the ranks of writers. Suffice it to say that between 1920 and 1926 over 150 writers, many of whom were to be the glory of Soviet culture, first published their works. Similar processes were going on in the world of art.

Significant changes thus occurred in the position of the intelligentsia and its world outlook during the first ten years of Soviet power. From a force hostile to socialism a large part of the old intelligentsia was transformed into a force collaborating with Soviet power. The intelligentsia was objectively a great help to the working class in restoring the dislocated economy, organising its management and developing culture. This, naturally, did not mean that the intelligentsia had fully embraced socialist positions. It was still in the process of transition. "The Soviet white-collar worker (teacher, doctor, engineer, agronomist, etc.) is, in his endeavours and attitudes, starting to become Soviet in essence,"¹ noted a decision of the 14th Party Congress at the end of 1925.

The socialist industrialisation of the country and the collectivisation of agriculture had a

¹ *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions...*, Vol. 3, p. 277.

particularly strong effect on the intelligentsia's world outlook. Many of its outmoded concepts were liquidated, there was a general reassessment of values and a final transition to socialist positions.

The main body of the intelligentsia approved of the industrialisation policy. The decisive victory of socialism was impossible on the old, backward, technological and economic foundations. It was necessary to organise major machine production in all branches of the country's economy, and above all heavy industry. Engineering, scientific and trade union organisations expressed their readiness to help the working class in this great cause. The main mass of specialists actively took part in the realisation of the grandiose industrialisation plans. The old intelligentsia had its share of labour heroes in the socialist construction campaign; these were people who were devoted to their work and invested with the sincere trust of the working class and the Communists. Agricultural specialists fully approved the programme for transforming this branch of the economy on a collective basis.

But not all the old intellectuals found the true path. Some of them took the course of sabotage, of undermining the economic might of the USSR. Several counter-revolutionary organisations consisting mainly of representatives of the big intelligentsia were exposed in the late twenties. No major political force backed them within the country, and they, therefore, gambled mainly on foreign intervention.

The sabotaging activities of some of the experts did not, of course, mean that all the

technicians were counter-revolutionaries to the last man. "...This can in no case be said of the huge majority of our engineers, who are honestly working with us,"¹ asserted G. K. Orjonikidze, who headed Soviet industry. The disclosure of the plotters' interventionist plans made large segments of the working intelligentsia recoil from them and at the same time realise that there was no other course for them than to work with the people and no other goal than to build socialism.

The plotters' sabotaging activities created serious difficulties in several areas of socialist construction. Nonetheless, taking into account the criminals' thorough repentance, a Soviet court deemed it possible to pass relatively mild sentences in the case of the overwhelming majority of the defendants and the Soviet government gave those convicted the opportunity of atoning for their faults with respect to the people through honest labour. And they took advantage of this opportunity. Many of them not only sincerely condemned their criminal past but also made an important contribution to industrial development in a very short period of time, for which they were given high governmental awards. Professor L. K. Ramzin, for one, was convicted as one of the main organisers of the conspiracy, but at his trial he asked to be given the opportunity of compensating for his deeds. The Soviet government trusted him and was not mistaken in so doing. A talented scientist and major specialist in the field of heat

¹ G. K. Orjonikidze, *Articles and Speeches*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1957, p. 233 (in Russian).

technology, Ramzin was highly instrumental in consolidating the country's industrial might. He was awarded the USSR State Prize (First Class), for designing a unique boiler. The same can be said of a number of other major scientists and engineers.

Anti-Soviet circles abroad were able to delude part of the intelligentsia in the Western countries, and several prominent scientists, men of letters and artists addressed protests to the Soviet Government against the measures taken with respect to the plotters. Such was the case of the famous physicist Albert Einstein, for instance. In 1930 he also signed a sharp protest against the conviction of a group of saboteurs who had caused serious difficulties with food in several districts of the country. But after some time had passed Einstein objectively got to the bottom of the matter. In September 1931 the German Professor H. Müntz published a notice in Soviet newspapers on behalf of Einstein explaining the latter's motives for signing the protest. It read in part: "I affixed my signature only after long hesitation, trusting the competence and honesty of the persons who asked me for it and, besides, considering it psychologically impossible for people who had full responsibility for work done to fulfil most important technological tasks to intentionally sabotage the goal they should have served. Now I deeply regret having given my signature because I have lost my belief in the correctness of my views at the time."¹

These events showed that there was no longer room for the former apolitical mentality and

¹ *Izvestia*, September 17, 1931.

neutrality. The Communists and the Soviet community at large conducted a decisive struggle to overcome neutralism and to make each intellectual a truly active and politically conscious ally of the workers and peasants in socialist construction. Well-attended meetings, discussions and debates were arranged for intellectuals at industrial enterprises, educational institutions and scientific establishments, during which apolitical attitudes and neutrality were morally censured.

The All-Union Association of Scientific and Technical Personnel to Promote Socialist Construction, founded in 1927, was instrumental in restructuring the psychology of the intelligentsia. Based on exclusively voluntary membership, the association conducted an energetic campaign against reactionary elements and drew considerable segments of the intelligentsia into building socialism.

Extensive work to overcome apoliticalness and neutrality continued to be carried out among the artistic intelligentsia. In this case a special role was played by professional associations, such as the Soviet Writers' Union, the Soviet Artists' Union and so on. The 1st National Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934 was a big event in the life of the creative intelligentsia. By that time a host of talented writers of worker and peasant origin had already established themselves in Soviet literature, and the position of the vast majority of the old writers had become ever more clearly defined. The main result of the congress was its graphic illustration of the ideological growth of wide circles of Soviet writers, their denunciation of apolitical

art and their recognition of the main goal of creative work to be serving the cause of socialism and of the people. "Wherein do I see the victory of Bolshevism at the writers' congress?" asked Gorky, answering: "In the fact that those of them who were considered unaffiliated, 'vacillating', have recognised Bolshevism to be the sole militantly guiding idea in creative art".¹

The Soviet people's successes in building up the state, the economy and culture had a decisive influence on the mood of the old intelligentsia. The formulation and successful solution of such difficult and scientifically and technically bold problems as the plan for electrifying the country, the building of the Turkestan-Siberia Railway, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station and the Magnitogorsk metallurgical plant, the rapid pace of industrialisation, the transition from small peasant farms to large agricultural production, the enormous achievements in the country's cultural life—all this filled each scientist, technician and artist who loved his work with pride and drew him into the mainstream of socialist construction. Here is what some prominent Soviet engineers—the airplane designer A. N. Tupolev, the electric power station builder B. Y. Vedeneyev, the head engineer of the Moscow Metro P. B. Rotert, the head engineer of the Moskva-Volga Canal S. Y. Zhuk and others—wrote about the process: "What made us engineers serve the cause of socialism? We were caught up by the joy of

¹ *The 1st National Congress of Soviet Writers, Moscow, 1934*, p. 675 (in Russian).

creating for the good of all mankind, we were carried away by the truly unlimited opportunities, unheard of throughout the history of humanity, to develop our creative powers, to engage in highly varied and powerful technological creation.”¹

All this made for great headway among the intellectuals. Whereas in the twenties there were quite a few vacillating, doubtful intellectuals, later on the strengthening of the positions of socialism led many of them to decisively support the policies of the Communist Party. The famous Soviet writer Leonid Leonov described the restructuring of the world outlook of the intelligentsia which had been formed before the October Revolution as follows: “The first phase was characterised by approximately the following social and psychological stand among the intelligentsia: ‘Well all right, I’m working for the working class, but my old traditions and views remain in their full purity and inviolability.’ The second phase was characterised by a radical re-evaluation of these traditions and the acceptance of the October Revolution not merely from the point of view of a *fait accompli*, but from an ideological and philosophical one as well, through a final transition to the “positions of the working class.”²

The selfless work of many old intellectuals was rewarded by the government, which bestowed Orders of Lenin and of the Red Banner of Labour and diplomas of honour on hundreds

¹ *Za industrializatsiyu* (For Industrialisation), January 26, 1934.

² *Sovetskoe iskusstvo* (Soviet Art), No 5, 1933, p. 36.

of experts who enthusiastically helped build socialism. The names of many engineers and technologists were inscribed on the All-Union Board of Honour and some of them received the high honorable title of Hero of Labour.

The efforts of scientists, engineers and technicians, every technological undertaking of theirs and valuable initiative were warmly supported by the workers, who expressed their approval of them at meetings and gatherings of work groups and in the press. On behalf of the many thousands of workers employed at the Moscow Hammer and Sickle Factory, worker D. Kochergin declared in 1929: "The worker knows the value of and is always grateful to scientific thought... I shall cite an example from our factory. A year ago our managing engineers decided to produce manganese steel, make castings of manganese steel. In the past this kind of steel had to be bought abroad and paid for with our gold. When our engineers took the daring initiative of smelting manganese steel and it turned out well and this steel began to be mass-produced, can it be said that our workers weren't grateful for this? The workers celebrated and thanked our engineers everywhere. And I think that the workers of the whole country will be grateful to engineers who speak the same language as us and think the same way we do."¹

The activities of the artistic intelligentsia were filled with new content. Socialism's successes, analysed from the position of the Bolshevik Party and daily Soviet reality, which offered

¹ USSR Central State Archive of the October Revolution.

magnificent examples of heroic and creative daring, opened broad creative horizons to the gaze of writers, artists, actors and composers and hugely stimulated the flourishing of their gifts and talents. Socialism let the artist know the joy of creating for his people, for the sake of realising mankind's noblest ideals. This is why many major cultural figures were able to fully develop their talents only in the Soviet period. "I have found genuine creative freedom and a thematic breadth and wealth uncircumscribable in a single life only now that I have a Marxist understanding of history and the great teachings of the October Revolution have given me purposefulness and method in reading the book of life," admitted the writer A. N. Tolstoy.¹ In 1933 he further declared: "The October Revolution gave me everything as an artist... Before 1917 I did not know whom I was writing for, (the annual edition of my works was at best three thousand copies). Now I feel a live reader whom I need, who enriches me and who needs me. Twenty-five years ago I entered literature as a pleasant occupation, as some kind of entertainment. Now I clearly see literature as a mighty weapon in the proletariat's fight for world culture and as far as I can I devote my strength to this fight. This living consciousness in me is a powerful influence in my creative work."²

These are the words of a man who bore the title of count in the Russian Empire, who had been far removed from the ideas of the libera-

¹ A. N. Tolstoy, *Collected Works* in ten volumes, Vol 10, Moscow, 1961, p. 202 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.

tion movement and had reacted to the revolution with hostility. But the great truth of socialism was the insuperable force which both brought the errant writer back from emigration and made him a classic of Soviet literature.

The apolitical and neutral mood among the old intelligentsia grew obsolete in the face of the successful practical building of socialism, and its bourgeois philosophy was surmounted. The construction of the new society underway on a grandiose scale all over the country convinced the intelligentsia that the working class and the Communists were involving ever broader circles in building a new, popular culture and achieving remarkable results. This gave the working class and its Party the opportunity both to finally sever politically unstable elements of the intelligentsia from the remainders of the bourgeoisie and to gain a moral victory over them.

The thirties were a milestone in the history of the old intelligentsia. This period saw its complete transition to the positions of socialism and its merger with the young Soviet intelligentsia it had helped train. It also witnessed the disappearance of the very term "old intelligentsia", that is, the intelligentsia which had once been bourgeois in world outlook. Scientists, technicians, literary men, artists—these were now Soviet intellectuals devoted to the cause of building socialism and actively participating in socialist construction together with the working class and the working peasantry.

For many intellectuals the restructuring of their views was a highly complex process. The famous actor I. M. Moskvin sincerely confessed this in 1937: "...I joyfully accepted the revolu-

tion. But when the old heritage began to be ruthlessly smashed, I am ashamed to say I got a little confused, lost my bearings, because the bench on which I had been standing for forty-three years before the revolution was knocked out from under my feet. I hung in mid-air, but I have got myself out of that position by now. I was dragging a forty years' tail at the time of the revolution, and you can't cut that off at once. I had many prejudices, apparent prosperity, dead traditions and was indifferent to the surrounding reality. It would, of course, have been possible to hurry up and repaint myself red on the outside. But this seemed frivolous to me. I began to remake myself from the inside and became an active builder of our heroic life."¹ Hundreds of thousands of intellectuals followed the same path, from doubts and hesitations to a full and unconditional acceptance of socialism.

At the dawn of Soviet power Lenin had expressed the firm conviction that "the sum total of their experience will, in the long run, inevitably bring the intelligentsia into our ranks..."² His prediction turned out to be profoundly right. In the final analysis the absolute majority of the old intelligentsia adopted the positions of socialism. Some did so sooner than others, but the transition nevertheless occurred.

The main factor behind the change in the psychology and entire world outlook of the old

¹ *Masters of the Arts—Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*, Moscow, 1938, pp. 109-10 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "On the candidacy of M. I. Kalinin for the Post of Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 235.

intelligentsia, which caused their mass conversion to the ideological positions of Soviet power, was the enormous successes of socialist construction and the rapid pace of economic growth and cultural development. Socialism had graphically demonstrated its unquestionable advantages over capitalism. Scientists, technicians and cultural workers clearly saw that it was precisely the conditions of the socialist order which provided boundless opportunities for them to apply all their knowledge and talents in creative work for the good of the people.

Another most important precondition of the old intelligentsia's transition to the positions of socialism was the correct policy of the Communist Party, which firmly and consistently followed a course of involving the old intelligentsia in a national cause through all the means at its disposal, encouraging the honest workers and re-educating the vacillating and doubtful in the spirit of socialist ideology.

The fact that an absolute majority of the old intelligentsia in the Soviet Union sooner or later irrevocably embraced the positions of socialism was an outstanding victory of the Communist Party and the Soviet state system. It was hard for the working class and Communists to gain the upper hand over their enemies in open battles, on the Civil War fronts. But it was no less difficult for them to "win over the minds" of people who were both far removed from a socialist world outlook and sometimes opposed to it. The first successful instance of tearing the intelligentsia away from the bourgeoisie on a

mass scale and involving it in the building of socialism is of universal historic significance.

5. SOVIET POWER HAS CREATED A NEW, PEOPLE'S INTELLIGENTSIA

While devoting much attention to re-educating the old intelligentsia and drawing it into socialist construction, the Soviet state was simultaneously working on another task of enormous import, that of training the members of a new intelligentsia. It was not only a matter of part of the old intelligentsia's being indifferent or unreliable in the political sense, at least in the first years of Soviet power, but of its being very scarce in number. In 1913, for instance, there were only 136,000 people with a higher education and 54,000 with a specialised secondary one. Yet, the task of building socialism required an enormous number of specialists in all branches of the economy and culture.

The socialist revolution created all the necessary prerequisites and conditions for coping with the problem of training a new intelligentsia. Liquidating the privileges of the overthrown exploiting classes, it opened the doors of schools and higher educational establishments to the children of workers, peasants and the working intelligentsia and forever put an end to the state of affairs where all the achievements of culture were the property of a minority.

The formation of a new intelligentsia of the people was as unusual an undertaking as the building of a socialist society. The Communists once again drew on personnel from the old

intelligentsia for this purpose, for there was no one besides them to learn from. It was only through their help that millions of sons and daughters of workers and peasants became specialists in science, technology and culture. This fact once again confirmed the correctness of Lenin's tenet that the new society should be built with the help of the intelligentsia inherited from the old order.

Higher and specialised secondary educational institutions were the main source of new personnel to fill the ranks of the intelligentsia. Particular attention was, therefore, devoted to sharply expanding the network of universities, institutes and technical colleges. Even during the Civil War universities were opened in Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky), Voronezh, Irkutsk, Tiflis (Tbilisi), Baku, Yerevan, Tashkent, Minsk and Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk). The number of technical colleges and institutions of higher learning training teachers, engineers, doctors and agronomists grew as the geographical concentration of such establishments changed radically, with a considerable number springing up in national districts in the east and south of the country.

But it was not enough to open new colleges and institutes. It was necessary to carry out comprehensive measures ensuring the children of the working people a real right to education. The full democratisation of schools of higher learning immediately followed the democratisation of schools of general education. All formal impediments to the enrollment of the children of workers and peasants in higher educational establishments were removed by decrees of the

Soviet Government. Lenin instructed the heads of corresponding organisations that "extra-special measures be taken to ensure a chance to study for all who so desire, and to ensure there be no actual or legal privileges for the propertied classes. Priority must certainly go to workers and poor peasants, who are to be given grants on an extensive scale."¹

But a most difficult obstacle remained and let itself be keenly felt; this was the young workers' and peasants' lack of the general education necessary for studying in a school of higher learning. The idea then arose among the working masses themselves of organising so-called workers' faculties at universities and institutes so that in a few years of study the children of workers and peasants could be prepared for a higher education. The workers' faculties considerably promoted the renewal of the student environment and its replenishment with people of working origin.

Even in appearance the students in the workers' faculties differed sharply from the former well-groomed and fed bourgeois students. They were used to physical labour and many of them had gone through practical experience of the revolution and Civil War. Leaving their work-benches and ploughs, they came to study from the most distant parts of the country. Their appearance often caused amazement among the old professors. Here is how a teacher at Kazan University described the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Admission to Higher Educational Institutions of the Russian Federation", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 48.

arrival of the first workers' faculty students: "Bast shoes softly slap the university's light stairs, hob-nailed boots stamp loudly... Wearing grey soldiers' overcoats and leather jackets, with briefcases and without, in red kerchiefs and knitted shawls, in homespun peasant coats, the students came to the workers' faculty."

At the same time, these students had an irrepressible thirst for knowledge. They were willing to study fourteen to fifteen hours a day without fear of any privations, and the impossible could almost be expected of them. These young people got what they wanted. During their existence (1919-1940), the workers' faculties prepared 2.3 million young men and women, mainly from workers' and peasants' families for entering institutes and universities. Such people as the famous botanist and selectionist, Academician N. V. Tsitsyn, the major specialist in inorganic chemistry, Academician N. M. Zhavoronkov, the well-known historian, Academician M. P. Kim, the outstanding Soviet writers A. A. Fadeyev and Musa Dzhalil and many other prominent figures in science and culture received their certificates for a higher education at workers' faculties.

What did the democratisation of higher education mean in the social sense? A well-known characteristic of pre-revolutionary society was the continuity of higher education. Students were mainly recruited from families whose heads, in view of their profession or social position, had received a higher education (important officials, trading and industrial bourgeoisie, the nobility, the cream of the intelligentsia, etc.). The democratisation of higher

education in the post-revolutionary period was a decisive break with the tradition of higher education's successiveness. Higher educational institutions were opened to the children of workers and peasants who had had practically no access to them before the revolution.

The class principle followed in admitting students to schools of higher learning and the preference given to workers and peasants did not, of course, exclude the possibility of individuals from other classes and social groups being accepted. Some Western historians assert that it became nearly impossible for non-workers and peasants to receive a higher education. It is true that many young workers and peasants enrolled in schools of higher education and technical colleges in the twenties and thirties when the new intelligentsia was being formed in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in no year did the share of workers and peasants among the students surpass two-thirds. In 1924, for instance, they amounted to 38 per cent of the student body, in 1928, to 51 per cent, in 1933, to 66 per cent and in 1938, to 55 per cent. The remaining students were the children of intellectuals, office workers and even the petty bourgeoisie. This was an expression of the democracy of the Soviet social system.

The restructuring of the higher educational system also meant a radical change in the philosophical orientation of the curriculum, the students' education in the spirit of socialist ideas and concepts. The programmes of lecture courses were revised, new textbooks were written and study of the Marxist social sciences was made obligatory. All this aroused stubborn

resistance among the more conservative professors, who tried to conduct their courses as in the past, according to the canons of bourgeois science, and gave a stronger anti-Marxist accent to their teaching, mainly emphasised mysticism and so on. Most professors and teachers conscientiously expounded the same materials they had lectured on before the revolution. It was not their subjective fault that while retaining their old world view they could not, because they had not yet learned how to, satisfy the need of the revolutionary generation of students for genuine knowledge. But with the passage of time the professors' attitude to the reforms in higher education changed under the influence of the overall political situation in the country. Working out a new curriculum of courses and seminars aroused their interest in studying problems essential to the country and the people. Besides, extensive educational work was being carried out with the professors: lectures by prominent Marxists and courses and seminars on social and economic problems and historical materialism were arranged for them.

Supplanting bourgeois ideas in the consciousness of the old professors was a difficult, lengthy and contradictory process. It was a question of getting people who held and propagandised bourgeois ideas and had the most distorted conception of the Marxist world outlook to adopt it. Not all of them, naturally, even after many years, became convinced Marxists. The ideological weight of the past was too great for them to be able to entirely free themselves of it. But they realised that there was no going back to the past and that the new Marxist-Leninist

ideology was becoming supremely established in the country. Once they realised this they were faced with the necessity of seriously studying the revolutionary science of society, applying it in their teaching practice and becoming actively involved in the country's public and political life. Professor N. S. Derzhavin defined the position of scientists and educators in higher educational establishments to be "not neutrality but enthusiasm, not an apolitical mentality but politics cubed, politics to the ninth power in the interest of the working class, in the interest of our revolution."¹

Measures were simultaneously taken to train young Soviet intellectuals and Communists as professors and teachers. In 1921 the first higher educational institution preparing specialists in the social and economic sciences, the Institute of the Red Professors, was founded. Other educational establishments trained instructors for higher learning institutions as well. In 1925 graduate departments were added to establishments of higher learning; these soon became the main training school for professors and teachers in higher education. L. D. Landau, M. V. Keldysh, S. P. Korolyov, I. I. Artobolevsky, A. I. Alikhanov and many other outstanding Soviet scholars began their scientific and teaching careers in the late twenties and early thirties.

Thus, by the mid-twenties both higher and secondary specialised education had been basically transformed along socialist lines. During the first ten years of Soviet power about

¹ Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

150,000 specialists received a higher education and 200,000 a specialised secondary education. When one takes into account the enormous difficulties of the Civil War period and the first years of peaceful construction, one has to admit that this is an outstanding achievement. But these were very modest figures compared to the country's need for experts. In the late twenties and early thirties the state, therefore, took radical measures to sharply expand the higher and specialised secondary education system. The expenditures for these purposes were comparable to the investments in industrial capital construction. The number of higher educational institutions, technical colleges and workers' faculties grew at an exceptionally rapid pace. Many courses were also set up to prepare young people for technical colleges and schools, and correspondence, general education and special training courses for people to take while continuing work became widespread.

The Soviet state's efforts to train intellectuals at institutions of higher learning and technical colleges bore remarkable fruit. There had been 105 institutions of higher learning in 21 cities with a total enrollment of 127,000 students in pre-revolutionary Russia; in 1938 there were 708 in 156 cities with a total enrollment of 620,000 students, or 50 per cent greater than the number of students in Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Germany combined. The picture was the same in the realm of specialised secondary education. Instead of the 450 specialised secondary schools of tsarist Russia there were about 3,800 of them in the Soviet Union in 1940, and the number of students in them was eighteen

times greater than in 1914.

The network of institutions of higher learning and technical colleges spread rapidly in the national districts. In republics that before the revolution had not had a single higher educational institution there were by the early forties: 23 of them in Byelorussia, 14 in Azerbaijan, 29 in Uzbekistan, 5 in Tajikistan, 21 in Kazakhstan and so on. There were 19 higher educational establishments in the Ukraine before the revolution, and 129 in 1939. As a result, all the peoples making up the Soviet Union were able to form their own national intelligentsia. With the help of their Russian brothers, many millions of working people from formerly backward and downtrodden peoples got the opportunity to reach the heights of science and culture.

Here is the typical path of one of them, the Kazakh mining engineer Zhaken Dairbekov: "My father was illiterate when he died; he had known hunger and poverty all his life. My life was not much better at the beginning either. But that accursed time has passed; the revolution swept away and threw out the oppressors... While continuing to work in the mine, I began to study. In 1928 I became a member of the Komsomol. In those years a campaign was underway to transform the Karaganda Basin into one of the country's major coal bases. The Donetsk Basin experts helped us in everything, particularly in training personnel. I was sent along with some fellow-workers to the Donetsk Mining Institute... After finishing my studies and graduating with highest honours, I returned to my native Karaganda. Could my father have imagined that his son would become an en-

gineer? Yet, there are thousands of people in Kazakhstan who in a short period moved from farm-labourer to engineer, to economic manager, to statesman."¹

Schools of higher learning and technical colleges were not the only way of training a new intelligentsia. Another method of replenishing this social stratum was found within the Soviet system, by promoting the best representatives of the working class and labouring peasantry to leading posts in Party, state and economic affairs. The promoted workers and peasants subsequently studied hard, improved their professional and cultural level, and in the end, many of them became fine specialists and intellectuals in the full sense of the word. The name of Ivan Alexeyevich Likhachev is widely known in the USSR. He did not have the corresponding education when he was appointed director of the first automobile factory in the country, but his energy, intelligence, will power and sense of responsibility for the important business he had been entrusted with helped Likhachev to acquire a technical education without interrupting his work and become a major expert in and organiser of automobile construction. Now the Moscow automobile plant which he once headed bears his name. Many similar cases could be cited.

The mass training of specialists made for a sharp increase in the proportion of qualified staff. By 1941, 909,000 persons with a higher

¹ A. N. Nusupbekov, *The Formation and Development of the Soviet Working Class in Kazakhstan (1917-1940)*, Alma Ata, 1966, p. 97.

and 1,492,000 with a specialised secondary education were employed in the national economy. A considerable number of capable workers and peasants were promoted to administrative posts, to positions within the Soviet state apparatus and Party and public organisations. New members of the creative intelligentsia were also formed.

Building the foundations of socialism in the USSR called for profound changes in the structure of Soviet society, in the fate of classes and social groups, including the intelligentsia. As the socialist system became firmly established the old intelligentsia organically merged with the new, which was flesh of the flesh of the people and bound up with it by blood ties. It was a great achievement of the Soviet people and the Communist Party.

The creation of a new intelligentsia is a historical necessity and a natural result of the socialist revolution. An intellectual's work is not the prerogative of the "cultured classes", handed down from generation to generation. Former workers and peasants became scientists, engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, writers, actors and statesmen. Socialist reality contains a multitude of examples of how a person from the "lowest strata of society", according to the concepts of bourgeois sociology, rose to the heights of scientific and artistic creativity. We will confine ourselves to only one such example. In his childhood during the Civil War the waif Kolya Dubinin led a vagrant life, sleeping in attics and eating whatever he could get his hands on. In old Russia there would have been only one path for him and thousands

of other young people his age—to the bottom, among the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat. But in the Soviet Union Dubinin became an Academician and winner of the Lenin Prize, and his works in genetics enjoy world recognition.

The Soviet intelligentsia, working selflessly together with the whole people, made an important contribution to the building of socialism: the industrialisation of the country, the collectivisation of agriculture, the development of socialist culture and the strengthening of the state's defensive might.

The intelligentsia's authority abroad grew in step with its increased participation in building socialism. Soviet scholars took an active part in all sorts of international scientific congresses and conferences and their work was highly valued by the international scientific community. Writers, actors, artists and composers convincingly proved through their work that literature and art cannot fence themselves off from life under a mask of political indifference and that a true flourishing of culture is possible only under socialism.

When the threat of a new world war hung over mankind, Soviet intellectuals conducted an active campaign in defence of peace. In March 1932 in a passionate address entitled "Whom Are You for, Masters of Culture?" Maxim Gorky called upon the intelligentsia of the world to rally in a united front against reaction and war. Soviet intellectuals actively participated in international anti-war congresses and anti-fascist committees. When the Italian black shirts attacked Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Soviet people were the first to raise their voice in protest.

Spain became an important front in the struggle against the forces of fascism and war, and Soviet intellectuals directly participated in this struggle.

The active social stance of the Soviet intelligentsia on the international arena, as well as its creative work, permeated by genuine humanistic ideas, considerably affected the rallying of the progressive forces. The slander spread by the enemies of peace and socialism came to naught. In the Soviet intellectual the world public saw not an "elect of the spirit" severed from the people, not a groundless dreamer and utopian, but an active creative individual belonging to a collective, a public figure, a passionate advocate of peace and opponent of the forces of fascism and war—for this is what he had become.

Soviet intellectuals fought heroically during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) as part of the regular army and partisan detachments and worked in the most responsible sectors on the home front. Together with the people at large the intellectuals staunchly endured the adversities of the war years, contributing all their strength and knowledge to the attainment of victory over the enemy.

The losses during the war years, the need to rebuild and further develop the national economy and culture and the scientific and technological revolution increased Soviet society's need for highly qualified personnel. In the post-war years the number of intellectuals in the country grew at a particular fast rate. Today they form a huge army of many millions of scientists, technologists, cultural figures, state and Party officials and military men. About 10 per cent of the general population and some 20 per cent of

the people employed in the national economy are intellectuals. The intelligentsia has now outstripped the collective farm peasantry in growth rates and absolute membership alike.

New members join the intelligentsia from all the social groups of Soviet society, but the migration of the workers, peasants and their children into the ranks of the intelligentsia is of a particularly mass character. They are the decisive factor in the numerical growth of the intelligentsia.

When trying to charge the Soviet intelligentsia with elitism, with having become a sort of bourgeoisie of the state, Western sociologists usually cite the managing echelons in the economy and the Party and state apparatus, access to which is allegedly closed to those "from the people". Actual Soviet reality convincingly refutes these assertions. The following data on the social origin of the USSR's managing workers were given at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: over 80 per cent of the secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist parties of the Union republics and of the territorial and regional committees of the Party, and the chairmen of the republics' councils of ministers and of the executive committees of territorial and regional Soviets, as well as nearly 70 per cent of the ministers and chairmen of the state committees of the USSR began their careers as workers or peasants.¹

Socialism has not only changed the social and national composition of the intelligentsia, but

¹ See *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, p. 118.

faced it with new creative tasks as well. It has a huge role to play in creating the material and technological basis for communism. Scientists, engineers and technicians are a mighty productive force in Soviet society. They have made major discoveries in various fields of human knowledge. The maturity of Soviet science and technology is most convincingly confirmed by Soviet achievements in space exploration and in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Building a new society requires both the utmost development of the forces of production and the education of Soviet people in the Communist spirit. The formation of a new man is the most important concern of the Soviet creative intelligentsia. Soviet men of letters and artists have produced major works truthfully reflecting the life of the people. The works of Maxim Gorky, A. N. Tolstoy, M. A. Sholokhov, Ch. Aitmatov, E. Mieželaitis and many others are world famous. The best Soviet films, the renowned Soviet ballet, the universally recognised creations of Soviet composers, sculptors, actors and painters are all extremely popular.

Soviet society takes profound interest in the work of its intelligentsia and justly values its services. The finest engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, scientists, men of letters and artists are given high governmental awards and honorary titles.

Finally, mention must be made of one more developmental peculiarity of the modern Soviet intelligentsia—its increasing social and political activity. Each year a growing number of intellectuals link their fate with the Communist Party. About 20 per cent of the 15.7 million

Communists in 1976 were members of the technological intelligentsia, while over 24 per cent were men of science and literature, artists, educators, workers in public health and management, military men. Millions of intellectuals are deputies to the Soviets and take an active part in the country's social and political life.

The Soviet intelligentsia's great activity on the international arena was always its strong point. Soviet people have always come out for establishing firm creative and public ties with foreign scientific and cultural figures, ties leading to mutual understanding between peoples and promoting the cultural progress of mankind. The Soviet intelligentsia campaigns particularly actively in defence of peace, for the reduction of international tension and the establishment of good-neighbourly relations among all the nations of the world.

The development of the intelligentsia under modern conditions convincingly shows that socialism not only does not minimise the importance of the intelligentsia but, on the contrary, provides the most favourable conditions for its creative work in all spheres of social development and brings genuine spiritual rebirth and satisfaction in work done for the good of society. "Important creative tasks are resolved by the people's intelligentsia, which is indissolubly linked up with the working class and the peasantry," L. I. Brezhnev has said. "The higher the cultural level of our society and the greater the progress in science and technology, the more appreciable will be the growth of the role played by intellectuals in carrying out the far-reaching

tasks confronting the Soviet people."¹

As a result of the further progress of the socialist economy and social relations achieved under developed socialism, the community of interests and ideological unity of Soviet society have increased, and this permits one to speak of the formation of a union of the working classes and the intelligentsia as an actual fact of Soviet reality. The important principle underlying this union is reflected in the new Constitution of the USSR, Article 19 of which proclaims: "The social basis of the USSR is the unbreakable alliance of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia."

The Soviet people and the Communist Party highly value the intelligentsia's contribution to the building of communism and support its spirit of creative enthusiasm, quest and healthy initiative. All the variegated activities of the Soviet intelligentsia show that in it the socialist society has an immense force, which contributes all its talent, knowledge, experience and energy to the cause of building communism.

* * *

Coping with the problem of the intelligentsia in our country was a long and difficult process. The Communists and the Soviet state had to overcome many difficulties to ensure the co-operation of the most qualified and experienced segment of bourgeois society in building socialism and creating a people's, socialist, intel-

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 26.

ligentsia. In dealing with the problem of the intelligentsia the Communists of the Soviet Union accumulated much valuable experience, which can be reduced to the following points:

1. For the bourgeoisie which effects a revolution and overthrows the power of the feudal class the intelligentsia is not a problem of paramount importance. By the time it seizes power it already has on its side a more or less significant number of intellectuals whom it nurtured in the heart of feudal society and who are devoted to it. The problem must be solved quite differently by the working class. The proletarian revolution, whose goal is socialism, does not find any ready forms of socialist economy. At the same time, because of its lack of the corresponding economic basis and all the conditions of its existence, the proletariat cannot create any significant number of its own, socialist intellectuals while still under capitalism. It can nurture them only after seizing political power, in the course of building socialism. This is one of the fundamental differences between the socialist and bourgeois revolutions.

2. The fact that the working class does not have a numerous intelligentsia is not an obstacle to its seizure of political power. As the experience of the October Revolution showed, it is precisely because only the socialist revolution creates all the necessary conditions for a socialist cultural revolution and the formation of a people's intelligentsia that the Russian proletariat had to seize power.

3. The use of the bourgeois intelligentsia, which is in many ways tied with capitalism, to restructure the old society on socialist founda-

tions is an inevitable process. The regularity of such phenomena in social life was theoretically grounded by Frederick Engels in the following passage, cited in Lenin's book *The State and Revolution*: "...Each social revolution will have to take things as it finds them and do its best to get rid of the most crying evils with the means at its disposal."¹ This is just what the Communists did in Russia, using the bourgeois intelligentsia in their fight against inequality and cultural backwardness.

4. Drawing the bourgeois intelligentsia into socialist construction is, according to Lenin, a form of class struggle under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it is a peculiar form of class struggle, sharply differing from such forms as the suppression of resistance by the exploiting classes, as civil war and so on. Its peculiarity consists in the fact that the working class drew part of the forces against which it had to fight into collaboration. This form of class struggle required the decisive suppression of hostile acts by counter-revolutionaries among the bourgeois intelligentsia, the neutralization of vacillating, unsteady elements and their subsequent involvement in building the new society and, finally, the use of all intellectuals loyally (and sometimes not even loyally) inclined to strengthen Soviet power. It was a form of class struggle not against the intelligentsia as such but for the intelligentsia.

¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Housing Question", *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 11, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 333.

5. The creation of a new, socialist intelligentsia by re-educating the old and training, with its help, expert personnel from the working strata of the population is a historical necessity and natural result of the socialist revolution.

Historical experience shows that any country which breaks with capitalism and enters the socialist path of development inevitably confronts the problem of drawing the old intelligentsia into building a new society and creating incomparably more numerous intellectuals from among the workers and peasants. This was the case with the countries of Eastern Europe, where after the triumph of the socialist revolution the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia (except for frenzied counter-revolutionaries and people clinging to the ideological positions of the bourgeoisie) in the end went over to the side of the revolutionary people. But it was also necessary to build a new, socialist intelligentsia. The Soviet Union's experience in coping with the problem of the intelligentsia came in very handy to these countries' Communist and Workers' parties. However, the socialist countries did not blindly apply this experience, but filtered it through the prism of their national and historical peculiarities.

The experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state is, undoubtedly, of great value for the revolutionary parties of those countries which will enter the path of socialist development in the future, for they will inevitably be faced with the problem of the fate of the intelligentsia in the

transitory period from capitalism to socialism, with the problem of how to draw it into building a new life and of training new intellectual personnel. This is one of the important historical lessons of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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